


# Marine Corps Gazette

DEC 1957  
FORTY CENTS



# Marine Corps Gazette

DECEMBER 1957

NUMBER 12

VOLUME 41

*Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps*

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This month's cover is from an original oil painting by MSgt John DeGrasse, our Art Director. The original painting will be presented to the Commandant of the Marine Corps by BGen R. D. Salmon, Editor in Chief of the *Gazette*.

We are proud to present, in this issue, one of the finest articles on strategy we have ever read: *American Sea Power and the Indian Ocean* by the distinguished author and lecturer, George Fielding Eliot.

Many parents and relatives of Marines have told us how much they appreciate receiving the *Gazette*. It keeps them informed about the Corps, what it stands for, what it thinks. A subscription to the *Gazette* is a thoughtful and valuable Christmas present.

On behalf of the Editor in Chief and the staff of the magazine, we wish you A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS.

## PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

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
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*Opinions expressed in the Gazette do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps*



# Operation Call and Haul

During Exercise "Call and Haul" at Fort Riley, Kansas, 15 U.S. Army Otters of the 2nd Company moved 305 fully equipped combat troops of the 16th Infantry a distance of 35 miles in 80 minutes.

Subsequently, 10 Otters shuttled 20 tons of ammunition and supplies into an improvised "battle field" landing strip in a 45 minute period.

The Otter carries a crew of two—over a ton of payload—lands in less than 600 feet.

8-57




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Designed, built, and flown in record-breaking time, the new "economy size" Lockheed JetStar can perform the following missions (just as well as the big jets—and for only a fraction of their costs):

**For ATC:** The JetStar fills an indicated need of the Air Training Command for a "top-off" navigator bombardier trainer aircraft which more nearly equals the speed of jet bombers on operational duty. Cruising faster than 450 knots at altitudes up to 45,000 feet, the JetStar fills existing speed/altitude gaps between trainer and tactical aircraft in current use.

**For MATS:** The Aids to Airways Communication Service, operated under the Military Air Transport Service, is charged with the responsibility of airways inspection. The JetStar's high speed and altitude capabilities—com-


parable to today's tactical aircraft—will permit more thorough and effective airways inspections.

**For SAC:** The Strategic Air Command depends upon high speeds to rush high priority cargo from its headquarters to its retaliation bases. The new Lockheed JetStar can transport critical parts for bombers and navigation instruments to SAC bases—with jet speed (but at much lower cost than the big jets).


In addition to those above, the new Lockheed JetStar can perform many other essential military missions. Like all Lockheed planes the JetStar is easy to maintain, and has the inherent stamina to insure optimum utilization—qualities that are more important today in military aircraft than at any time in our history.

GEORGIA DIVISION, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Marietta, Georgia

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## Section Training

... Comments on Col W. F. Prickett's "Basic Training" which appeared in the September issue of the *GAZETTE*.

Two of the most impressive examples of section training occurred during the Korean War. The first one in 1951 started in the G-2 section, Marine Detachment, US Naval Amphibious Training Command, Little Creek, Va. This training began more as an information program, but developed into a section and finally a detachment training program.

The second section training program, and by far the most impressive to me, was the G-2 section, 1st MAW in Korea in 1953.

I approached the ACofS G-2, with a modified basic and technical training schedule. This he endorsed and the G-2 section's training program started. The classroom was the G-2 staff briefing room. Classes were held in the evenings for 2 hours: rifle and personnel inspections were held at 1300 each Wednesday.

Some lessons learned about a successful "Section" training program are:

a) Definite training objective. It should not be conducted just because some other section is doing it. Plan your training to teach something needed.

b) Enthusiastic instructors. During your planning of a training program think carefully about who will do the instructing and provide some training for your instructors. Use of rank over knowledge is wasteful. Utilize all ranks.

c) Complete cooperation of the section head. This will be found to be a major consideration. An enthusiastic and encouraging section head will see the same reflected in the instructors and students.

Here at Marine Barracks, Great Lakes, I am training NCO; so again I am in a position to see many of the training problems of a headquarters type unit. We do have some training problems to solve, but through the cooperation and efforts of the OinC of the various sections and the able assistance

of the NCOs, we are slowly but surely doing something constructive about this ever present and very real task of training.

Training is one of the most demanding and challenging tasks confronting a leader, as Col. Prickett comments, "Let's Not Give Up."

MSgt H. C. MANION

Marine Barracks  
Great Lakes, Illinois

## Welcome Aboard

... I am taking the liberty of writing to you with respect to this organization's participation in the Marine Corps Association, and further to enclose a money order in the amount of \$20.00 for new subscriptions.

This organization has on its rolls 23 Marine Corps Officers and I am very happy to report that as a result of a recent drive to support the Association, we now have 100 per cent participation. A group picture of this organization's officers was taken and will appear in the 3d MarDiv newspaper *Triad*.

CAPT BURT C. SIMMS

3d Shore Party Bn, 3d MarDiv  
FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

Ed: Any other 100 per cent units?



## Good Idea

... The April issue of the *GAZETTE* was another excellent issue for this year. I believe the average is high. I would like to make one comment on the chain of command charts in previous issues. They are very good, especially for posting on bulletin boards, etc, where men can see and read them. Only trouble is

if you want to save your *GAZETTES* it deletes part of an article — such as *Rotate by Battalions*. If the back of the chart pages were left blank, or the advertisements printed on the back, then the chart could be removed for posting and parts of an article would not be missing.

TSgt JACK W. JAUNAL  
29 Palms, Cal.

## Men Against the Mountain

... Having just finished reading Col Prickett's article "Fight the Enemy" (*GAZETTE*: Oct '57), I am forced to take issue, since the point in question is a mere play on words. The key to successful land warfare is the terrain and its relation to the human element that are engaged thereon. The wording "seize, occupy and defend" a certain piece of terrain is not to achieve a place in the sun, but a "point of control" for a given battle situation. For example; the seizure of Mt. Suribachi by the 28th Marines on Iwo Jima was more than just planting the American flag or enjoying an excellent view of the Pacific, but to reduce a heavily fortified area that controlled the landing beaches and over one-half of the island. When I say a play on words, the seizure of the objective-Hill ———, infers and includes the destruction of the enemy; if there is doubt as to this statement, someone has missed a portion on the phases of offensive combat. To the best of my knowledge and experience there is no written doctrine that states, when occupying a piece of terrain the occupying force will remain near the crest or on the forward or reverse slopes. The individual in command, the situation, enemy forces and the overall tactical plan will affect the type of tactics and positions to be employed. Maybe our teachings and past experiences have created the attitude the Colonel mentions; if so, a re-emphasis on the subject might be in order, but let's not deemphasize terrain and its bearing on the tactical situation. By changing the wording we would accomplish just that!


Instead of Col Prickett's different approach, let us have a better understanding of the meaning and purpose of seize, occupy and defend.

CAPT R. F. MAIDEN  
I&I, 11th SpecInfCo, USMCR  
Galveston, Texas

## Thanks

... The November issue of the *GAZETTE* featured a reproduction of the Official Seal of the Marine Corps on the cover, with the suggestion that it was designed to be cut out and framed. This

(continued on page 7)



## HIGH SPY!

Designed to operate in conjunction with radar tracking sets, this new giant telescopic tracker can trace a missile, balloon or artillery shell 300 miles away. Through its 400-pound lens, the operator gets a crystal-clear picture in natural color.

The specialists trained to command this optical colossus are key men. That's why, when

they're needed at a new location, they're sent the fastest way — via the Scheduled Airlines — a definite economy both in terms of pay and per diem dollars. When *you're* sending men to new assignments, call your Scheduled Airlines representative for the facts on how to keep your men **ON THE JOB . . .** not "on the way".

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
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## THE SOLDIER

Much more than the H-Bomb is needed to insure our total security.

For the threat of massive retaliation is not a complete deterrent to aggression. Border incidents and "brush fire" wars cannot be handled by nuclear weapons alone.

What kind of military program, then, do we need? The consensus of top military strategists answers it this way:

We must have forces capable of meeting every aggressive threat, adaptable to the strength and skill of the aggressor and to the terrain, climate and geographical factors in the military problem involved.

This means the mobile, lightning-fast soldier of the new Pentomic Army...the man on foot with a gun in his hand, artillery behind him, and the full might of our entire arsenal readied for his support. For this man is the military policeman upon whom the keeping of the peace must always heavily depend.

*Martin is a prime contractor to all branches of the military. Among the most advanced weapon systems currently being produced for the soldier is LACROSSE. As the prototype of a new family of artillery guided missiles, this important weapon is one of the basic developments of the Army's advanced Pentomic concept.*

**MARTIN**  
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is a fine idea and I imagine that many offices and homes will soon be adorned with the picture.

Publication of the reproduction on the cover of the GAZETTE will cause some consternation, however, among those subscribers who keep files of the magazine and have them bound. There are undoubtedly many people who like to keep the various issues intact and who would also like to frame a copy of the cover.

It would have been preferable to reproduce the Seal on an inside page where it could have been removed without ruining the magazine. This could probably be offset by making copies of the cover available to interested individuals at a small charge. You could even do better than this by making an extra cover available to subscribers at no charge, with a charge being made to those who do not subscribe.

CAPT GEORGE E. MORRISON  
3825 Ingalls Ave.  
Alexandria, Va.

ED: *We have a limited number of cover reproductions on hand, which will be sent without charge to those requesting them. One cover for each request.*

### Keep up the Good Work!

... We continue to enjoy reading and using articles from the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE in our instruction. The account of the operation on the Sinai Peninsula (GAZETTE: Sept '57) was indeed interesting. I used it as an illustration of the present-day value of rather-conventional tactics that have been of value so many times in the past. We can still do a great deal with the intelligent use of what we have now.

BGEN L. C. HUDSON  
LFTU, Little Creek, Virginia

On 10, 11 and 12 September, of this year the first Annual Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition was conducted at Marine Corps Schools. The competitors consisted of one rifle squad chosen from each regiment within the Marine Corps. The competition was won by the representative squad of the 8th Marines, 2d Mar Div.

All members of the winning squad of the 1957 competition will be meritoriously promoted. Further, provisions are being made to meritoriously promote the members of squads winning this competition in succeeding years, subject to concurrence by their Commanding Generals.

# American Seapower Indian Ocean

By George Fielding Elliot





# and the

The Indian Ocean is the sole remaining power vacuum. Control of this ocean directly affects the Middle East and Southeast Asia and, therefore, is a matter of strategic concern to the US and especially to the Navy.



THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF THE US NAVY, THE Indian Ocean has remained virtually an unknown sea. We have had few if any naval interests in its waters. Save for the pursuit of far-ranging Confederate sea-raiders during the Civil War, and the round-the-world cruise of the Fleet in 1908, it was rarely indeed that an American man-of-war was seen in the Indian Ocean prior to WW II.

This American disinterest in one of the world's great oceans was, like the Monroe Doctrine, a tacit acceptance of the Pax Britannica. British control of the Indian Ocean was one of the eternal verities of world politics. From the October day in 1783 when brave Admiral Suffren sailed for home, after his vain struggle to revive the French power in India, until that Easter morning of 1942 when the Japanese fleet, having broken into the Bay of Bengal, launched its dive-bombers against Ceylon, the Indian Ocean was at peace under the British trident. With the exception of the Mesopotamian campaign in WW I, such fighting as took place on its waters or along its shores was incident to local wars or colonial operations in Asia and Africa, or to the intrusion of occasional commerce-destroyers such as the German *Emden*.

The Japanese assault on Ceylon in 1942 was the curtain-raiser for a new era. It marked the beginning of the decline of British seapower and the contraction of the Empire which that seapower sustained. So far as the Indian Ocean is concerned, the climactic event in this imperial retreat has been the withdrawal



**George Fielding Eliot** is a distinguished author and lecturer. Born in New York, he was educated partly in the US and partly in Australia. He holds a BA from Trinity College, University of Melbourne. From 1939 to 1947 he was military and naval correspondent for the NY Herald Tribune. He was military analyst for the Columbia Broadcasting Company from 1939 to 1946 and for the Mutual Broadcasting System from 1950 to 1952. He lectures at the US Naval War College, National War College, Command and General Staff College and the Canadian National Defence College.

of British power from the great central position of India. Once deprived of this base area with all its resources and its strategic location between the eastern and western gateways of the Indian Ocean, the ability of Britain to maintain, unaided, the command of those gateways has been seriously impaired. Withdrawn also from Ceylon and Burma, Britain has not, today, a single naval or air base over the entire 3600 miles from Singapore at the northeast corner of the Indian Ocean to Aden at the northwest, save for a refueling station on an atoll in the Maldive Islands.

Yet with the translation of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya into independent states, the specifically British military responsibilities in the Indian Ocean have greatly diminished. Today they may be defined as the protection of commerce, notably that of the oil-trade of the Persian Gulf; the extinguishing of the last embers of Communist revolt in Malaya; and the security of sea-communications with Australia and the Far East. In all of these, the United States also has an interest of varying degree. All of them are connected with the continued security of the Indian Ocean and of the nations around its shores. The basic requirement of that security may be stated in a single phrase—exclusion from the Indian Ocean area of Communist power and influence.

This is also a vital consideration to the global strategy of the struggle against the Communist coalition—a strategy in which Britain bears an important part, but of which the power of the United States is the mainstay. Thus today, for the first time in history, the United States has a definite long-term strategic in-

terest in the Indian Ocean; and because of the diminished power and authority of Britain in that area (as elsewhere) the United States is required to support that interest with its own power, or at least to be visibly prepared to do so.

Strategically, the Indian Ocean is an enclosed sea to which entrance from other seas may be had only at the corners:

- 1) On the northeast, by the water passages through or around the flanks of the so-called Malay Barrier (the islands of the Indonesian Archipelago). Of these passages, the Straits of Malacca and Sunda and the route north of Australia through the Timor Sea are the most important.
- 2) On the southeast, the route from the Pacific Ocean south about Australia.
- 3) On the northwest, the Suez—Red Sea—Gulf of Aden entrance

from the Mediterranean.

4) On the southwest, the route from the Atlantic Ocean around the Cape of Good Hope.

During the long period of British control, all these entrances were either directly controlled by Britain, or commanded by British bases. Within the Indian Ocean, the Indian sub-continent provided a superbly located base position, and Britain controlled, directly or indirectly, much of the remaining Asiatic and African shoreline as well as the island continent of Australia to the southeastward. While France, Portugal and the Netherlands (and for a time Germany and Italy) had colonial possessions bordering on the Indian Ocean, the French harbor of Diego Suarez, at the northern tip of Madagascar, was the only defended naval base flying a flag other than Britain's. Thus British control of the Indian Ocean was so complete as to fall within the strictest classic definition of seapower—the control of sea-communications for her own use, and the ability to deny them to any enemy.

This sea-control gave security and flexibility to the employment of the magnificent Indian Army in support of British strategic policy. The Field Forces of that Army—four divisions, five cavalry brigades and supporting elements—were maintained in a high state of readiness, and in case of need could be reinforced substantially from the vast reservoir of Indian manpower, for which the In-



*A cruiser and destroyer refuel at sea*





*. . . alongside a tender for maintenance*

dian Territorial Force and the Indian State Forces provided a framework. Of the regular units of the Indian Army, about one-fourth of the infantry, one-ninth of the cavalry and nearly all the artillery were British.

The command, staff and administration of the Indian Army acquired a wide background of experience in organizing, supplying and embarking expeditionary forces tailored to the varying requirements of British needs within and adjacent to the Indian Ocean area. During the latter half of the 19th century, it became habitual to employ the Indian Army as an Imperial strategic reserve throughout the whole vast region from Egypt to the South China Sea, a practice to which the transfer of authority from the East India Company to the British Crown, following the great Mutiny of 1857, contributed.

Between 1857 and WW II, the Indian Army from its own resources mounted and carried through to success, wars of considerable dimensions in Ethiopia, Burma and Afghanistan; took a notable part in the in-


vasion of Egypt in 1882; conducted the Mesopotamian campaign in WW I; and also provided not only large contingents of the British Empire forces in Egypt, the Dardanelles and Palestine, but sent a complete corps and a cavalry division to fight on the Western Front in France. Indian units formed part of the permanent garrisons of Aden, Singapore, Hong-kong and Mauritius, and were repeatedly employed in dealing with minor troubles in the Persian Gulf area.

British control of the Indian Ocean and of its entrances and exits was thus directly associated with the amphibious teamwork of the Indian Army and the Royal Navy. This power-position within the Indian Ocean was a principal ingredient of British predominance in the Middle East, so essential to maintaining direct communication between the United Kingdom and India, Australia and the Far East. Until the rise of Japanese naval power, it prevented the development of any serious rival in this region. It was the tacit reliance of the Dutch in the East Indies and the Portuguese in

Mozambique and Timor; it was the guardian of Australia and of many a British ward from the Sultan of Zanzibar to the Sheikhs of Kuwait and Trucial Oman and the Rajahs of the Malay Peninsula.

It was based on sound principles—concentration, mobility, economy of force. Local security elements were kept to the minimum requirements of immediate defense, pending seaborne reinforcement. So long as the Royal Navy could deny the sea-approaches to the Indian Ocean to any hostile sea-power, there was no means by which an exterior enemy could break into the area, except by a major land campaign through extremely difficult terrain. On the northeast this was not to be anticipated during the long centuries of Chinese military weakness. The defense of the northwest frontier of India against a possible Russian thrust was, however, a constant preoccupation of the Indian Army, and three wars with Afghanistan were fought with the primary purpose of scotching Russian influence in that country. Farther west, Russian or German pressure on Iran was usually





**USS Forrester — symbol of modern sea power**

countered by British seaborne pressure at the head of the Persian Gulf. It was, however, from this point to the Suez Canal and the Levant Sea that the real danger to the British imperial position in the Indian Ocean was habitually considered by British strategists to be most acute. The defense of India and the Indian Ocean area was inseparably bound up with the security of the Middle East against the traditional ambitions of expanding Russian imperialism or the opportunistic ambitions of a Napoleon, a Hohenzollern or a Hitler.

But given the continued capability of the British fleet to exclude rival navies and of British power and diplomacy to deny the Middle East to invaders by land, the British "system" within the Indian Ocean was virtually unassailable. If it had a weakness, *distance* was the name for it.

The British possessions were almost entirely lacking in industrial resources. Until the completion of the Singapore base in the 1930's, the nearest British dockyard capable of carrying out major repairs to a capital ship was at Malta, 6,000 miles from Singapore and 4,000 from Bombay. This weakness, of course, was relative; as long as no other power was capable of operating capital

ships within the Indian Ocean, Britain could and did maintain her naval control there by means of a cruiser squadron and a handful of destroyers, aided by sloops for such duties as chasing gun-runners and slave-dhows in the Persian Gulf and showing the flag in various remote ports as occasion required. Control

of the entrances (and more or less of the waters beyond them) and the absence within the Indian Ocean of any naval rival made this possible. It was the growth of Japanese sea-power that forced a penny-pinching British government to bring the Singapore base to completion; and it was the loss of Singapore and the



breaching of the Malay Barrier entrances by the Japanese fleet that marked the beginning of the end of British control.


The conditions which the United States today faces in seeking to establish its own naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean, are similar in some respects to those of the British past, but quite different in others.

Geography has not changed. The Indian Ocean is still an enclosed sea, controllable by control of the four entrances. Two of these, at the southeast and southwest, lead from waters (the Pacific and South Atlantic respectively) in which our seapower is paramount. The first is flanked by Australia, which we may assume will continue to be friendly to our purposes and is at present our Ally. The second is flanked by the Union of South Africa, which can hardly be willing to see a Communist intrusion into the Indian Ocean. It is at the northeastern and northwestern entrances that future difficulties are to be anticipated. In neither case is hostile seapower the major threat we must now consider. It requires an elastic imagination indeed to suppose the Soviet Navy capable of forcing the Malay Barrier in the teeth of our Pacific Fleet. In the Mediterranean, a land-air campaign of considerable dimensions



*F2H is parked aboard carrier*





***USS Thetis Bay embarks Marine assault troops***

would have to be mounted against our Turkish allies before the Soviet Black Sea Fleet could pass the Dardanelles, and even then it would have a long way to go and formidable opposition to overcome before it saw the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.

The real and present danger to our interests at these two entrances of the Indian Ocean is found in the weakness of the states flanking the narrow waters—the Republic of Indonesia on the one hand, and the Arab states on the other. This weakness invites Communist interference and infiltration.

In Indonesia, the indigenous Communist Party has just taken second rank in the municipal elections and seems to be gaining ground rapidly in the populous island of Java, though far less successful in the outlying islands. There are signs that the people of Borneo, Celebes, Sumatra and the Moluccas are growing restive under centralized Javanese rule. Military revolts, without exception anti-Communist in character, have taken place or are in progress in all these islands. The saving grace here is that Indonesia is an archipelago. Were a Communist regime to take over in Java, it is difficult to see how, lacking seapower, it could overcome anti-Communist resistance in the other islands. The Indonesian Navy consists only of small destroyers and escorts, and not many of these; inter-island shipping is chiefly carried on in Dutch bottoms under contract with the Indonesian government. Should the attempt nevertheless be made, we would have to consider very carefully whether we

should not intervene to protect the non-Communists in the outlying islands. Certainly those islands could be denied to Communist control if we decided to make the effort to do so, and we would be under strong pressure from Australia and (probably) from the Philippines to take firm action. Indeed, so far as the islands immediately to the westward of New Guinea are concerned, it is unlikely that the Australians would suffer them to be taken over by Communist force even if they had to intervene alone. On the other hand, in any free-world intervention, the Soviet (or Red Chinese) countermove would surely be to try to furnish arms, ships and planes to the Indonesian Communists, accompanied by a flood of propaganda and denunciations of "imperialist aggressors," etc., both in the court of world opinion and in the United Nations. This boils down to a question with which we have already been faced in the Middle East—are we or are we not going to use our seapower to prevent the delivery of arms to local Communists and their dupes for the purpose of subjecting their fellow-countrymen to Communist rule and attacking their non-Communist neighbors?

At the northwestern entrance to the Indian Ocean we find Egypt, already infiltrated by Soviet influence and with armed forces re-equipped with Soviet weapons after a considerable proportion of earlier Soviet deliveries was taken away from them by the Israeli in the whirlwind 4-day Sinai campaign of last Fall. Egypt has seized and retains control of the Suez Canal. Yemen, at the southern

exit of the Red Sea, has also received Soviet arms and is making trouble for the British in the Aden protectorate.

In all these danger areas, the problem of preventing Communist exploitation of local weaknesses and local conflicts is complicated for us by the rising wave of Asian nationalism. The habitually anti-Western tendency of this movement is, of course, a heritage from the imperial past; but there can be little doubt that the policies pursued by some Asian governments are characterized by a lack of prudence and restraint which is directly related to the visible weakening of British authority. The collapse of the British power-system from Egypt to the Malay Sea, and especially the disappearance of the Anglo-Indian army with its seamobility, has left the Indian Ocean area virtually a power-vacuum. What is perhaps worse, it has left the Indian Ocean flank of the Middle East "in the air." Now as previously, the Middle East cannot be made secure, whether against direct or indirect attack, by efforts based on its Mediterranean flank alone: the pressure of seaborne power on both flanks—or its tangible presence—is required. And now as previously, weakness in the Middle East is the greatest source of danger to the Indian Ocean area, just as a power-vacuum in the Indian Ocean is a primary source of danger to the Middle East. These interlocking facts are instinctively recognized by the rulers and peoples of the entire region. The heady wine of nationalism becomes the more dangerously intoxicating when no rude awakening to a hangover of dire consequences is to be anticipated.

The effect of the dissolution of British power in the area has to be considered against the background of its long tenure of unchallengeable authority. For the better part of two centuries, it had sometimes been resisted, but never (in the end) successfully. Attempts to make deals with its distant foes had ended in invariable disaster. An Amir of Afghanistan might accept Russian presents and Russian promises, but then came a Roberts with his tough battalions of Tommies, Sikhs and Gurkhas, and the Russians—after their habit, which endures to this



day—discreetly withdrew from the presence of danger and sought less risky pickings elsewhere, leaving the reckoning to be paid by their dupes. A German agent might spread gold lavishly along the Persian Gulf, seeking a terminal harbor for the Berlin-Baghdad railway—but when it came to taking delivery of the goods, there on the sandy beach of Kuwait stood a company of Dogra sepoy, while the Union Jack fluttered alongside the Sheikh's banner over the custom-house. A wave of semi-Asian nationalism in the form of the Young Turk movement might make common cause with the German Empire and promise to expel British imperialism from all its holdings in the Near East: but the result was the break-up of the Ottoman, not the British imperial position in that region. Did a sheikh in Trucial Oman defy the British rule and start a profitable gun-running business? Came a sloop wearing the White Ensign to dissolve the Sheikh's mud fort with 4-inch shells, and the Sheikh's dream of ill-gotten gains with it. Did an Egyptian colonel named Arabi Pasha "The Egyptian"—egged on by Russian intrigue—gain control of the Army and begin preaching of Egyptian rights to the revenues of the Suez Canal? Came Sir Garnet Wolseley with British and Indian troops, backed by a battle fleet, to overrun Egypt in a smart 2-week campaign. Only 20 years ago, the one unquestionable fact in the minds of all who dwelt between Suez and Singapore was the invincibility of British power. The memory of man—indeed the legend of generations—ran not to the contrary. Nationalism might mutter in the bazaars; it might, on occasion, riot in the streets of Cairo or Calcutta; it might even massacre

a detachment of the Guides in Kabul, or the survivors of a British garrison on the ghat at Cawnpore. But there was no future in these outbreaks, and the more sober leaders of Asian and Egyptian nationalism knew it. Indeed there were great numbers of Asians who served the British "Raj"—were even willing to give their lives in its service. The Indian Army—one of the twin pillars of British power—could not have existed without them. Behind the Indian Army and the scattered detachments and garrisons around the rim of the Indian Ocean stood the Royal Navy. The British could come when they would, and in such strength as they needed, and no one else could come to challenge them. For the British held the sea and the gates of the sea.

That all this great and awesome fabric should dissolve in hardly more than a decade, as though at the wave of a genie's hand, is a circumstance which has much to do with the ebullience of Asian nationalism today, whether the particular exponent thereof be named Nehru or Nasser.

Within the Indian Ocean area, no force has appeared to take the place of the British-Indian system. No great naval or military power lives today upon the shores of that Ocean. Australia, in the far southeast, has in the presence of gathering danger and the absence of effective British protection, built up a far greater measure of military force (including a medium-sized Navy) than its taxpayers were previously willing to support. The indigenous units of the old Indian Army have been divided between India and Pakistan; each has also a small Navy and a small Air Force. In the Red Sea region, Israel's tough, well-commanded forces have a window on the

Gulf of Aqaba, and the Emperor of Ethiopia has an army which proved its quality in the Korean war. Nowhere else on the shores of the Indian Ocean and its tributary waters do we find an Asian or African state with armed forces having any fighting value beyond the maintenance of internal order.

As for British power, it has dwindled to small garrisons at Aden and Bahrein, a somewhat larger one at Singapore, the King's African Rifles in East Africa with a hard core of British infantry, and the forces now engaged in finishing off the Communist jungle fighters in the Federation of Malaya, which include British, Australian, New Zealand, African and Fiji units with 6 to 8 battalions of Gurkha mercenaries, supported by several squadrons of the Royal Air Force. A Malayan army is being built up, and has reached a strength of 7 infantry battalions and an armored car regiment. There is also a small air detachment at Aden, and one in Kenya. It is stated in the British White Paper on Defence that a carrier task force is to be maintained in the Indian Ocean, based on Singapore. But the political future of Singapore itself, to say nothing of Malaya or Kenya, is uncertain. Confronted by challenge, the British record over the past 10 years has been one of eventual withdrawal, with or without a preceding period of ineffective resistance. The anti-Communist campaign in Malaya was possible only because of the support of the majority of the Malay population; but even this is compromised by the presence of very large numbers of "Overseas Chinese."

The French are gone from their Indian enclaves, and from Indo-China; they remain only in Madagascar and French Somaliland. The Dutch have left Indonesia. The Portuguese in Goa are under constant Indian challenge. And along the northern frontiers of South Viet Nam, Laos, Burma and India itself, broods the vast growing military might of Red China, while the Soviet Union glowers across the borders of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.

Little wonder, then, that Asian nationalism is feeling its oats, or that men speak of Homer Lea's long-ago work, "The Day of the Saxon," with the respectful awe accorded to



*Amphibious assault training in Denmark*



**USS Gyatt—first guided missile destroyer**

a prophet whose words have been underlined by the iron pen of history.

Little wonder, either, that a similar ferment stirs in Africa, bursting forth in Mau Mau massacres and providing fertile soil for poison-seeds developed in Moscow and broadcast by Radio Cairo.

There are plenty of intelligent Asian and African leaders who realize the danger of Communist penetration and put no reliance in Communist promises. They know that weak, newly independent states, slowly groping their way toward a still uncrystallized future, cannot yet from their own resources find the power to resist the Communist colossus. But they are restrained, or at least hesitant, in seeking help from the only source of strength which has the necessary capabilities—the United States—by a morbid fear that outside power present in their vicinity means a lessening of their independence, even a threat to its continuance. This is, to them, the lesson of all experience with power coming from afar. Communist propaganda is fertile and ingenious in cynical agitation of this theme, which is the chief reliance of Moscow and Peiping in the existing interlude between the fading of British power and the not-yet-fully-prepared Communist advance into the resultant vacuum.

The military and political problem which faces the United States in the Indian Ocean area and in its Middle Eastern bastion is how to provide a reliable substitute for the British-Indian power system which will be visibly reassuring to Asian-African fears of Communist penetration, while arousing no counter-fears of American imperialism entering by

the back door as British imperialism departs by the front.

The first requirement necessitates: 1) short-term capabilities sufficient to bring effective aid to any threatened state of the area against limited or localized Communist or Communist-inspired threats and 2) long-term capabilities which could defeat a major Communist penetration should one be attempted.

The second requirement rules out the presence of American troops in the territory of any Asian or African state on anything like a permanent basis. Our Indian Ocean strategy cannot be founded, as was the British, by American *presence* on its shores, but rather by American *access* when and as required, associated with the development of friendly local forces.


Fortunately, Communist power is not yet established within the area either, unless it can be said to be established in Egypt. Sea-distance is a handicap to us, as it was to the British. But overland distance is an even greater handicap to the Com-

munist states and is compounded by some of the most difficult terrain, from the logistic viewpoint, to be found on the surface of the globe. Here a circumstance which served the British well can work as well for us: seaborne power can still concentrate more rapidly at the head of the Persian Gulf than landborne power can be conveyed there from the Trans-Caucasian or Trans-Caspian areas of Russia. Airborne power can be transported more efficiently over the surface of the sea than over mountain ranges: and the link-up is faster and surer. Penetration of the "fringe-land" from the "heart-land" is still an operation of war in which the fringe-land defenders have decisive advantages as long as help is available to them from the sea. Greece and Korea are but the most recent demonstrations of this truth; military history is replete with earlier examples.

In making seaborne support available to Communist-threatened people on the shores of the Indian Ocean, we lack the tremendous advantage of the central Indian base which the British enjoyed; but we have an advantage scarcely less valuable which they lacked. The vast Pacific Ocean area is a reservoir and nursery of American seaborne power. From its perimeter we can project that power in any required direction. Here, surely, is the base area from which our Indian Ocean strategy should be developed.

We cannot, of course, neglect the northwestern approaches. The vital bastion of the Middle East can no more be defended from the Indian Ocean flank alone than it can from

**Terrier is launched from USS Mississippi**






the Mediterranean flank alone. Our position in the Mediterranean, linked indissolubly with our participation in the North Atlantic Alliance, is bolstered by control of the Western entrance from a well-dispersed base complex in Spain, Morocco and the Azores, by a powerful striking force in the Mediterranean itself, by close association with the British base-chain Gibraltar-Malta-Cyprus. In the eastern Mediterranean we are in alliance with the principal military power of the region — Turkey.

The great strategic weakness on this flank arises from our lack of dependable control of the sea communications between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The missing link must be reforged. If this cannot be done by peaceable means, it will one day be done by military means under the pressure of necessity. It does not lie in the Nasser of this world to stand, for long, astride a great waterway upon which interests far beyond their comprehension are dependent.

Meanwhile, within the Indian Ocean itself, what are the immediate military requirements? For short-term purposes involving immediate support to endangered friendly peoples, it would appear that the time has come to maintain an American task force in the western Indian Ocean comparable to, though perhaps somewhat smaller than, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. This force should include at least one carrier (with a versatile air group) and one or two cruisers, with destroyers, mine-sweepers and escort types. It should have a high anti-submarine capability. Seaplanes will be very useful. A Marine element, of at least battalion landing-team strength, is indispensable, and should have sufficient transport facilities to provide ample and comfortable accommodations for troops who must spend much time on shipboard in one of the hottest climates in the world. At least two destroyer-type transports should be available for quick response to emergencies requiring only small forces. Perhaps even more important, a helicopter transport (LPH) should be included when available; hydrographic conditions along much of the Indian Ocean littoral make normal ship-to-



**USS Seawolf — atomic powered submarine**

shore movements difficult, and often enough the focus of trouble will lie well inland rather than right on the beach. While the Middle East Command, established by the Navy in 1949 — originally for flag-showing and acquiring familiarity with the area — now falls within the authority of the Commander in Chief Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, it would seem both more desirable strategically, and more convenient from the administrative point of view, to supply a larger Indian Ocean task force from the Pacific Fleet, with the Marine contingent provided by rotating BLTs from the 3d Marine Division. The "command frontier" between CINCNELM and CINCPAC might perhaps be adjusted in the light of future experience.

The distances are, of course, considerable: thus it is some 5,600 miles from Okinawa, where the bulk of the 3d Marine Division is located, to Bahrein in the Persian Gulf. But then, it is 3,000 sea-miles from Suez to Bahrein — and East Coast Marines are a long way from Camp Lejeune when they get as far as Suez! Also, the furnishing of the Indian Ocean task force from the Pacific provides for the constant coming and going of reliefs along the whole sensitive Asian fringe-land from Singapore westward, with many opportunities for calls at friendly ports and making impressive elements of American floating power visible to doubtful and anxious peoples. The use of an advance staging area in the Philippines and a practice of carrying out the actual reliefs well to eastward should diminish the time-risk factor

as regards the day-to-day strength of the Okinawa garrison and carrier availability in the Seventh Fleet.

Like the Sixth Fleet, the Indian Ocean task force should be sea-based with minimum dependence on local ports. An attempt to establish a permanent US naval base in the Indian Ocean might not be politically desirable at present. The force suggested has the versatility and striking power to handle local short-term situations in support of friendly forces, or even on its own in some circumstances. It could be rapidly reinforced from the Pacific (or perhaps from the Mediterranean) in case of need. But it seems indispensable that one more element of flexible power should be added — indigenous military forces which can be used, not only for local defense but for the support of distant collective operations. We can hardly hope to reconstruct an exact equivalent of the old Indian Army, but it is surely not beyond the bounds of possibility to find a reasonably acceptable, if somewhat smaller, substitute.

Thus in the Baghdad Pact area between Karachi and the Persian Gulf, one first-class Pakistani division trained for amphibious operations might make a very useful contribution, and if two could be made available we would be cooking on the front burners. US funds would be needed for training, transports, airlift, landing craft, weapons and equipment. Whatever the size of Pakistan's contribution to such an amphibious force, it would almost certainly involve an overall increase in her present establishment, since she has inherited the one-time Anglo-



Indian responsibility for the security of the Northwest Frontier. Other possible sources of troops for the amphibious needs of Indian Ocean security are British East Africa, or a British-Gurkha contingent from Malaya—and, of course, Australia in matters immediately involving Australian security such as trouble in Indonesia or a serious military threat to the Middle East. Finally, it is not impossible that the Emperor of Ethiopia might think it helpful to make say a regiment of his excellent troops available for amphibious training in connection with the security of the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden region.

At about this point, I can hear some modern-minded readers asking themselves whether I am really writing about plans for collective security in the atomic age, or am still living in the days of the Empire after all, when whatever military difficulties arose were at least divested of nuclear complications. I happen to think that it is just because we keep on mixing up nuclear "big war" with the requirements for dealing with limited war (or limited emergencies less than war) that our imaginations bog down in the latter category. Our needs in the Indian Ocean in big war are to be ready to move in with such force as may be required to keep open our sea communications, defend key positions such as the Persian Gulf, and deny the enemy any substantial success that would react upon more decisive theaters. We are not going to win the decision in such a war in the Indian Ocean; but if we lose the Middle East by weakness in the Indian Ocean, or allow a hostile penetration of Southeast Asia to cut our sea-lanes, we shall be in serious difficulties. Command of the sea, freedom to move forces and cargoes at will upon its surface, or through the air space above it, is the essential foundation of American strategy. Nuclear offense and defense would, in such a war, be employed as might be required to effect our purposes in the Indian Ocean as elsewhere. The availability of commanding officers, navigators, watch officers, aircraft pilots, Marine and Army commanders with a useful degree of familiarity with the climate, winds, hydrographic conditions and local politi-

cal conditions of the Indian Ocean region might make the difference between success and failure there; this was one reason for the establishment of the small Middle East Command 8 years ago.

In the field of limited operations, nuclear weapons have little or no foreseeable application to American military activities in the Indian Ocean area. Our objective being to exclude Communist imperial expansion without building an empire of our own, the increased stability of indigenous non-Communist regimes is the only alternative. We should seek to provide for these regimes, during their period of gestation, those elements of military force which they cannot yet create for themselves in sufficient strength, and without which they may not be able



***The versatility of sea-power is remarkable***


to survive. This is a delicate procedure. Mutual confidence is the basic ingredient of success. It is vital that we should convince our Asian and African friends that we cherish no imperial ambitions. It is just as vital that we should convince them that when they need our help, we have both the will and the ability to give it effectively without using weapons which might do more damage to friends than foes. We assume no military handicap in so doing. The application of tactical nuclear weapons lies elsewhere than in the fringes of Asia or the jungles of Africa, so long as these contain no hostile targets appropriate to such weapons.

Weapons, of course, are only the instruments of military policy—just as military policy is but a part of the national policy which provides the weapons. It is beyond the limits of this paper to attempt any definition of the overall objectives of our national policy: but that these objectives must be global in scope has been clearly demonstrated by the

experience of the past decade. To conduct a global policy from an insular base—such as North America—the primary requirement is command of the sea, and today of the over-sea air lanes also. The historic recourse of land-bound conquerors against the flexibility of seapower has been to seek control of narrow sea-defiles by overland advance. The British learned this lesson step by painful step. The shape of their Empire, and the support of its military requirements by the British taxpayer, both came to be founded on the principle that hostile or potentially hostile control of narrow waters vital to British freedom of movement was not to be endured. Freedom of movement upon and over the seas is as vital to America today as ever it was to Britain. Control of sea-defiles by hostile or potentially hostile land-power must become as instinctively intolerable to Americans now as it was to Britons a foretime. This demands a certain toughening of the national will; a shift of the relative values we assign to local pretensions as against the rights and the safety of the free-world community of nations.

Changes of national viewpoint so drastic as this do not come about quickly, save perhaps under the explosive shock of a Pearl Harbor. As these words are written, Soviet political and semi-military gambits in the Middle East continue. It has not yet dawned on many of us that Soviet access to the Middle East is at our sufferance, save at the price of an overland war involving the risk of Soviet survival—a risk which they show no desire to accept. We hold the sea, and yet we allow the gates of the sea to be endangered. Thereby we risk our own survival.

Happily, we show signs of increasing awareness of the use and requirements of mobile power. We are well established in the vast Pacific theater. We are the architects of the North Atlantic Alliance, and maintain a strong establishment in the Mediterranean. To link these two power-areas by an increased naval effort in the Indian Ocean would not only be strategically and politically desirable, but it might provide the final element in an accepted global strategy based firmly on the principle of mobility. US MC



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# ENGINEER SUPPORT TO THE FMF

**Introducing the Force Engineer Group. An approach  
to a problem which must be solved before  
planning any future operation**



**By LtCol G. L. H. Cooper**

THE ENGINEER IS A RELATIVELY new addition to the Marine Corps, actually dating back only to 1940. Prior to that time engineers did exist, but not in the quantity, or with the ability, to provide the required support to the Corps' combat elements, ground or air. Since 1940 the engineer picture has had numerous changes, some good and some bad, and we now have a further change which is being brought about by the new M Series TO/E.

This change affects all branches of the service and it is believed that now is an excellent time to consoli-

date our position from an engineer standpoint and to determine exactly how the Marine Corps will go about providing engineer support to its divisions, wings and force troops when considered individually or when combined into a Marine Air/Ground Task Force. This article presents one approach for solving the problem of providing engineer support to the FMF.

While the Marine Corps continues to operate on the theory that the man with the bayonet is the prime factor in the successful completion of any mission, the fact cannot be



overlooked that the Marine Corps is greatly dependent on mechanized equipment. Self propelled guns are replacing the truck or tractor drawn piece. A great proportion of a division can be hauled from point to point by its organic motor transport. There are highly complicated and heavy pieces of equipment such as the Terrier Sam and the Honest John Rocket. There are the aircraft which play such an important part in our air-ground concept. All of these, plus many more, will require support of an engineer nature to successfully operate.

This engineer support will range in scope from a simple, hastily pioneered road such as would be needed to bring supplies to a front line battalion, to a fully operational airfield capable of handling any type of aircraft in the military service. Between these two extremes the list of

engineer projects is endless and to attempt to catalogue them for an article of this type would be pointless. Added to the projects of a normal engineer nature, of course, will be the many protective installations which the nuclear age is forcing on us.

First, take the support which will be required by the MarDiv itself. Under the new M Series Tables of Organization, the division will be able to provide itself with only the essential support required to provide its front-line units with the proverbial beans and bullets. In other words, the roads built and maintained by its organic engineers or pioneers will be of a most elementary nature.

After an initial beachhead has been established and the division moves inland, it will require backup support of an engineer nature to

retain its contact with the beach, port or major supply installation. Backup support means that some outside agency relieves the division of engineer responsibility for the development and maintenance of all engineer works, except that of a pioneer or combat nature, in the division's immediate zone of responsibility.

Secondly, consider Force Troops who will undoubtedly be in on the operation with its Service Regiment, its artillery, its missiles, its rockets, the Force Hospital and so forth ad infinitum. These people are going to require much engineer planning and effort if they are to operate.

Lastly, look at the problem presented by Marine Corps Aviation if it is to be brought ashore to provide support to our ground forces. Here the engineer problems are enormous and must be of a more predeter-





***Engineer problems for aviation are enormous***

mined nature than those posed by the ground forces. Airfields must approach certain specifications, fuel must be available at the site, revetments must be prepared for the protection of all installations and constant maintenance will be a prerequisite. Actually, the engineer problems of a wing are greater than the combined engineering problems of both the division and force troops. At present it is hardly clear as to how these problems are to be solved.

It should be pointed out here that the problems involved in providing engineer support to Marine Corps aviation are going to exist whether or not airfields are in existence in the objective area. Too many people are prone to surmise that, with an airfield or airfields present, engineer support will not be too important. Unfortunately, an airfield represents one of the most lucrative targets that a potential enemy can have and it is most certain that such targets will not be overlooked. Nor

would a potential enemy worth his salt allow an airfield to be abandoned without putting it out of commission. These airfields must be repaired and, in most cases, increased in scope. In any event, maintenance of any field will present a considerable engineer problem.

Where is this engineer support to come from? From what source will come the agencies necessary to plan for, to coordinate and control the engineer effort necessary to make possible the successful accomplishment of a modern amphibious operation involving a MAGTF? Needless to say, the engineer effort required to support such an operation will be of a sizeable nature and these questions must be answered.

With regards to the engineer support required by a MarDiv, its organic engineers, or pioneers as they are called under the M Series, can provide the immediate support required with the exception of bridging if an operation is to be of a short duration. This engineer support

will be of a hasty nature and the ability to maintain long lines of communication will not exist. The division engineer has become strictly a combat engineer whose responsibilities must be limited to the immediate support of the division itself and, if long lines of communication must be maintained and improved for more economical and rapid transportation, backup support of an engineer nature will be necessary just as the division's artillery will require support from force artillery. This support can be provided by the Force Engineer Battalion whose potential is that of heavy construction rather than combat engineering. It is entirely possible that an entire Force Engineer Battalion, reinforced by force bridging and explosive ordnance units, might be necessary to back up the MarDiv on an operation lasting a considerable length of time.

Force Troops, when operating as part of a MAGTF will have a heavy engineer requirement which will, in part, overlap the requirements of the division; i.e., the routes of communication from the force beachhead to the division supply points will be mostly located in the zone of responsibility of Force Troops, and work begun by the division will be more fully developed. This work would be the responsibility or assigned task of a Force engineer Battalion. Other work such as fulfilling the requirements posed by our missile units, artillery and other force elements would also become tasks of the Force Engineer Battalion. It is possible that one Force Engineer Battalion would not be sufficient to provide the engineer support to Force Troops and still be capable of providing the backup support required by the division.

While it is believed that the Marine Corps through its organic engineers, division and force, can provide the needed support to its division and force troops in a MAGTF, when the problem of supporting the task force's aviation is posed, a great lack of ability is only too evident. The Marine Corps does not have and probably will never have the organic ability of supporting its aviation from an engineer standpoint. One reason for this lack is the fact that, if the Marine Corps did organize its engineers in quan-



**LtCol Cooper** was commissioned a 2dLt in the US Marine Corps on 27 August 1940, after graduating from VMI. He has served with the 2d, 3d and 7th Engineer Battalions and in addition has served as Assistant Force Engineer, FMFPac, and Force Engineer, FMFLant. He wrote the article because of a sincere belief that the Marine Corps must "firm up" its concept of Engineer support to the FMF.

# FORCE ENGINEER GROUP SHOWING POSITION MAGTF COMMAND STRUCTURE




FIGURE 1

tivity for the support required by its aviation, it would then be duplicating an already existing capability within the naval service.

This capability lies within the Naval Mobile Construction Battalions or Seabees who did such yeoman service during WWII in support of both Naval and Marine aviation as well as Army (Air Force) aviation. The Marine Corps no longer has these Seabees organic to its engineer elements as it did during WWII, and it is not believed that a return to this concept is desirable. However, the Department of the Navy policy states that where a construction problem is beyond the capability of FMF units, Naval Mobile Construction Battalions will be assigned to augment the efforts of these FMF units. It is only too evident that the Marine Corps does not have the organic capability of supporting its aviation and that we will

have to rely on our friends, the Seabees, to provide this support. It is believed that this situation will continue to exist in the foreseeable future.

As has been shown, it has been determined that engineer support to Force Troops and backup support to the MarDiv will be provided by Force Engineer Battalions. It has also been determined that engineer support for Marine Corps aviation will have to be supplied by the Navy through its Naval Mobile Construction Battalions. The number of Force Engineer Battalions and Mobile Construction Battalions would, of course, be determined by the facilities existing in the area, the facilities required and the duration of the operation. In any event, the engineer effort required by a Marine MAGTF would require the formation of an Engineer Group, and an agency which can take care of the

initial planning, determine the material required and see to the coordination and control of the overall engineer effort.

The agency for the planning coordination and control of this Engineer Group would take the form of a Force Engineer Group Headquarters under whose control would come all of the engineers available to the Task Force, with the exception of those organic to the division. This headquarters, the nucleus of which would be provided by the office of the Force Engineer at FMF-Pac or FMFLant, would have a command status and be assigned a Task Group designator. It should be activated at the same time as the Headquarters of the MAGTF and other Task Groups in order that it may begin its planning and carry it along concurrently with the other planning for an operation.

This early activation is particular-





*Someone must build and maintain the field*

ly important in view of the fact that operational planning will be affected many times by engineer requirements, particularly when aviation is to be considered. The engineer must always be fully abreast of and have his hand in the operational planning in order to see that the engineer planning is properly considered and that all plans are feasible from an engineer standpoint. If this is not done, the success of an operation may well be jeopardized.

Through the above described Engineer Group Headquarters, whose commander also acts as Task Force Engineer Officer, the Task Force Commander is able to control the overall engineer effort in the most efficient and economical manner possible. In it he has one agency to which he goes for the entire engineer picture and from which he receives the required advice as how to best utilize his engineer forces. If necessary, through this agency he can redeploy his engineers wherever needed; i.e., if the division has need for additional support, the Force Engineer Group Commander can verify the need if he has not done so already and immediately make available the necessary troops from his command.

As has been said before, all engineer effort other than that organic to the division would come under the control of the Force Engineer

Group Headquarters. The Engineer Group itself, for the maximum support of a one Division/one Marine Aircraft Wing Task Force might appear as shown in Figure 1.

Tasks assigned to such an Engineer Group would be as follows:

- 1) The provision of backup support to the division.
- 2) The provision of engineer support to the wing.
- 3) The provision of engineer support to the logistic effort.
- 4) The development of facilities such as ports or beaches for the unloading of supplies.
- 5) The provision of engineer support to all Force units.
- 6) The provision of general engineer support to the Task Force as a whole.

While Figure 1 shows an Engineer Group that might be required for the maximum support of a one Division/one Wing Task Force, the organization of an engineer group to support a larger task force would remain essentially the same except for the number of engineer units required. Basically, except for the rank of the commander and of his section heads, the Engineer Group Headquarters would remain the same. The beauty of the entire Engineer Group concept lies in the ability to tailor the engineer support necessary to fit each operation and to provide one central engineer

headquarters which can properly plan, coordinate and control.

Such an Engineer Group will be necessary regardless of whether or not the ground forces and the aviation forces are operating, or plan to operate, in the same immediate area. As was stated earlier, without proper planning for engineer support it is quite likely that such support will not be available when needed. The most important job that the Engineer Group Headquarters can accomplish is during the planning phase for an operation. If this planning is properly accomplished, and tasks assigned properly for the support of the Task Force, the control and coordination of the engineer efforts should be a relatively simple matter under normal circumstances.

However, an agency such as the Engineer Group Headquarters must be available for the control and coordination of the engineer effort during the actual operation, and the importance of this control and coordination cannot be overemphasized. Too many things can come about during an operation that can cause a 180° change in plans. The responsibility for the redeployment or realignment of engineer effort should be vested in an agency which has detailed knowledge of the entire engineer picture. This can only be with a headquarters working in close cooperation with, and having close at hand the facilities offered by, the Headquarters of the MAGTF; i.e., the Force Engineer Group Headquarters.

The foregoing discussion is based on staff studies and field work accomplished by the Force Engineer Section, FMFPac, during the period October 1955-July 1957. During this period, working both in the Camp Pendleton area and in the Far East, this Force Engineer Section provided personnel for the formation of a Force Engineer Group on all major exercises involving a MAGTF. While much has been accomplished, it is believed that the surface has only been scratched. However, even scratching the surface is more than has been accomplished heretofore and, with continued efforts in this direction, it should not be too long before the Marine Corps is fully aware of its engineer problems and equipped to cope with them properly. USMC



The books listed below have been received recently by the GAZETTE for review. More detailed reviews of many of these books will appear in subsequent issues. These books may be purchased at the GAZETTE BOOKSHOP now. Association members who are interested in reviewing books should notify the Editor and Publisher.

**GEORGE WASHINGTON'S RULES OF CIVILITY**—Lewis Glas-  
er. Charlottesville, Va. \$1.00

A neat illustrated booklet which re-  
produces the 110 "Don'ts" which George  
Washington inscribed in his copybook.  
The copybook is preserved in the Li-  
brary of Congress. To lend a colonial air  
to the booklet, the Rules are recreated  
in broad nib goose quill calligraphy.

**TRANSISTOR A. F. AMPLIFIERS**  
—D. D. Jones and R. A. Hilbourne.  
Philosophical Library, New York. \$6.00

This book details systematically with  
the design of transistor audio-frequency  
amplifiers, and gives the circuitry and  
design details of a versatile range of am-  
plifiers, including those for high fidelity  
reproduction and public address sys-  
tems with undistorted outputs up to 20  
watts. The transistor mainly concerned  
here is the p-n-p germanium type. The  
book was printed in Great Britain.

**TIME FOR A PARTY**—Ruth Brent.  
McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York.  
\$4.95

This complete guide to home enter-  
taining shows hundreds of new ways to  
entertain graciously with a minimum of  
expense and effort. Every aspect of  
party giving is included. Photographs  
of table settings show how gay and at-  
tractive your own table can be. The  
wife of a Marine Corps colonel, Mrs.  
Brent has drawn on years of experience  
in party giving, teaching household art  
and writing on the subject to prepare  
this attractive volume.

**NORTHWEST AFRICA: SEIZING  
THE INITIATIVE IN THE WEST**  
—George F. Howe. Office of the Chief  
of Military History, Dept of the Army.  
US Government Printing Office, Wash-  
ington. \$7.75

This is the 37th volume in the series,  
*United States Army in World War II*,  
and the first volume in the *Mediterranean Theater of Operations* sub-series.  
The author tells why and how the Allies  
invaded French North Africa on 8 No-  
vember 1942. It was here that the Allies  
learned lessons which stood them in  
good stead for the rest of WWII.

**ENSIGN O'TOOLE AND ME**—Wil-  
lian J. Lederer. W. W. Norton & Co.,  
New York. \$3.75

The author of *All the Ships at Sea*  
rides again—up the Yangtze, down the  
China Sea, into the Pentagon and rough-  
shod through the Admiral's mess. A  
new and hilarious, partly serious, skir-  
mish and love affair with the US Navy.

**UNHEARD WITNESS**—Ernst Hanf-  
staengl. Lippincott, Philadelphia. \$4.95  
Harvard-educated "Putzi" Hanf-  
staengl was a member of Hitler's inner  
circle. His importance ranged from the  
emotional hold his musical ability had  
on Hitler's senses to the valuable entree  
which he could provide to the world of  
international experiences and sophisti-  
cation. He fled Germany in 1937 but  
returned there after WWII. This is his  
story.

**KHRUSHCHEV OF THE  
UKRAINE**—Victor Alexandrov. Phil-  
osophical Library, New York. \$4.75

A biography of Nikita Khrushchev,  
First Secretary of the Russian Com-  
munist Party, considered to be the most  
powerful individual in the USSR. In  
addition to dealing with Mr. Khrush-  
chev, the book is also a detailed por-  
trait of post-Stalin Russia. It has been  
a best-seller in England, Germany, Italy  
and France.

**SUEZ STORY**—William F. Long-  
good. Greenberg, Publisher, New York.  
\$3.50

The story of the Suez Canal, from the  
first primitive ditch dug 2,000 years be-  
fore Christ down through the British-  
French invasion of 1956, and the use of  
the Canal today. Also included are the  
pertinent facts about the vast Suez  
Canal Company.

**DEW LINE**—Richard Morenus. Rand  
McNally, Chicago. \$3.95

The story of the 3,000-mile Distant  
Early Warning line—America's elec-  
tronic Paul Revere. This is the dra-  
matic account of how the almost impos-  
sible task of building this final link in  
the 10,000-mile warning loop around  
our country was accomplished.

**AIR SPY**—Constance Babington-  
Smith. Harper & Bros., New York. \$4.00

This is the full story—told for the  
first time—of Photographic Intelligence:  
what it means, how it works and what  
it actually achieved in WWII. Here is  
a new behind-the-scenes angle on some  
of the most dramatic and important  
events of the war in Europe.

**CONSTANTINOPLE**—Harold Lamb.  
Alfred A. Knopf, New York. \$5.75

The magical city of Constantinople  
and the era of Justinian the Great (A.D.  
527-565) are evoked and recreated in  
this volume. Ranging from the decline  
of Rome to the reign of Justin I (518-  
527) and through that of Justinian,  
Harold Lamb re-creates the character,  
accomplishments and failures of Jus-  
tinian. The reader finds himself pres-  
ent, not at the obsequies of an ancient  
civilization, but at the very birth of our  
own.

**A UNITED NATIONS PEACE  
FORCE**—William R. Frye. Oceana Pub-  
lications, New York. Clothbound, \$3.75.  
Paperbound, \$1.00

An inquiry into the prospects and  
value of setting up a permanent United  
Nations Peace Force. This book ex-  
plores the potentialities, limitations and  
history of various types of international  
forces, and concludes with definite rec-  
ommendations as to the kind of force  
that could be created most feasibly and  
effectively now. The volume was spon-  
sored by the Carnegie Endowment for  
International Peace.

**GENTLE TIGER**—Charles L. Dufour.  
Louisiana State University Press, Baton  
Rouge. \$3.50

Chatham Roberdeau Wheat was the  
leader of the famed "Louisiana Tigers"  
during the Civil War. This is his story.  
A gentleman by birth and lawyer by  
profession, Wheat was above all a sol-  
dier. In rapid succession he fought in  
the Mexican War, with Lopez in Cuba,  
with Carvajal and Alvarez in 2 Mexi-  
can revolutions, with Walker in Nica-  
ragua and Garibaldi in Italy before re-  
turning to Louisiana to lead the  
"Tigers."



**ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY**—*Edited by R. R. Palmer. Rand McNally & Co., Chicago.* \$6.95

Here is an excellent, all-new series of maps that gives a comprehensive presentation of the whole sweep of world history from ancient times to the end of World War II. The scores of highly legible new maps and the concise, original text were prepared by outstanding authorities in the field of world history.

**LIMITED WAR**—*Robert Endicott Osgood. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.* \$5.00

Re-examining the part that war has played heretofore in American foreign policy, the author argues that the United States must develop a sound and successful strategy of limited war as an essential instrument of our future diplomacy. He applies historical interpretation and analysis to America's postwar foreign policy and calls for a fundamental reorientation of America's approach to the use of military power.

**THE PRISONERS OF COMBINE D**—*Len Giovannitti. Henry Holt & Co., New York.* \$4.95

For 12 agonizing months Len Giovannitti was a prisoner of war in the heart of Germany. Now, writing with anger and compassion, he has fashioned from his experience a novel of men struggling to be free. The book centers around 6 men who were shot down and became the prisoners of Combine D. The author was shot down over Vienna during WWII, and thus became a prisoner.

**CUSTER'S FALL**—*David Humphreys Miller. Duell, Sloan & Pearce, New York.* \$4.50

This is the story of Custer's fight at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, as told from the Indians' viewpoint. It is one that has never been told before. The author interviewed 71 Indians who actually participated in the Battle, and he did so in their language. Mr. Miller has illustrated his book with portraits which he sketched or painted of these old warriors.

**HOW THE MERRIMAC WON**—*R. W. Daly. Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York.* \$4.00

The question of the true victory in the near-legendary battle of 1862, between the Monitor and the Merrimac is newly approached and explored here. The book's title indicates the author's verdict, reached after careful examination and assessment of the multiple factors involved in the battle. Illustrated with maps.

**THE 85 DAYS**—*R. W. Thompson. Ballentine Books, New York.* 50¢

On 4 Sept 1944, the great port of Antwerp fell intact to the British 11th Armored Division—but not until Nov 28th, almost 3 months later, did the first Allied ships arrive with the supplies needed for final victory. The story of what happened in those 85 days is one of the most terrible and most controversial of WWII. This original paperback book contains the story of the Battle of the Scheldt.

**THE MINT**—*T. E. Lawrence. Doubleday & Co., New York.* \$7.50

This is the story, alternately gripping and pathetic, bitter and humorous, of a group of men anxious to lose themselves as individuals and to become a functioning military unit. All the barracks-room bawdy talk, the hard training and the exhausting boredom of military life are in this book by the author of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* and *Revolt in the Desert*.

**YOU'RE STEPPING ON MY CLOAK AND DAGGER**—*Roger Hall. W. W. Norton & Co., New York.* \$3.75

When Roger Hall joined the OSS, both were very young. When they parted, the latter was dead. Mr. Hall's account of what passed between them is a brash, hilarious record. The dust jacket says this is a true story and one of the truly funny books to come from the war.

**KENTUCKY CAVALIERS IN DIXIE**—*George Dallas Mosgrove. Edited by Bell Irvin Wiley. McCowat-Mercer Press, Jackson, Tenn.* \$6.00

George Dallas Mosgrove was a sort of glorified company clerk serving at regimental headquarters. If he was ever more than a private, it is not recorded. Yet, no one has revealed the stark side of Confederate soldiers with more realism or has given the humorous phases of men in combat with a lighter touch than does Mosgrove in these reminiscences of a Confederate cavalryman.

**THE PRICE OF COURAGE**—*Curt Anders. Sagamore Press, New York.* \$4.50

This is a novel dealing with ground combat from the level of a company commander. The entire story covers but a few days and a few thousand yards of a campaign that has no clear aim other than the taking of real estate. The author, a graduate of the US Military Academy, was a platoon leader and rifle company commander in the Korean conflict.

**BLACK TRIUMVIRATE**—*Charles Moran. Exposition Press, New York.* \$3.00

This is the story of Toussaint Louverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe, all one-time slaves, who rose to positions of the greatest honor and might in the Haiti of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

**UNITED NATIONS REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY**—*Columbia University Press, New York.* \$2.00

This comprehensive document is the complete official text of the report with maps, which was presented to the United Nations General Assembly. The committee was composed of representatives from Denmark, Australia, Ceylon, Tunisia and Uruguay. Moscow has denounced the report as "propaganda," while the *New York Times* has hailed it as representing "the judgment of free world public opinion."

**ON THE BEACH**—*Nevil Shute. William Morrow & Co., New York.* \$3.95

A volume that is receiving wide acclaim. This novel describes what happened after the war that really did end all wars. BGen S. L. A. Marshall describes it: "As a world warning, it is more terrifying than anything yet put into print."

**VANGUARD!**—*Martin Caidin. E. P. Dutton & Co., New York.* \$3.95

This is a comprehensive account of the background and future hopes regarding the satellite that will be launched during the Geophysical Year of 1957-58. The author tells how the satellite works, how it is made and what the scientists hope to learn from the data it records.

**THE SECOND MAYFLOWER ADVENTURE**—*Warwick Charlton. Little, Brown & Co., Boston.* \$4.95

In July 1955, her keel was laid. In September 1956, she was launched. In April 1957, the Mayflower II departed Plymouth, England, for the New World. Illustrated with more than 30 full pages of photographs, this is the official story of the Mayflower Project. The author originated the idea, and participated in the activities throughout.

**MARINE ELECTRICAL PRACTICE**—*G. O. Watson. Philosophical Library, New York.* \$12.00

Printed in Great Britain, this book is intended to fill the gap which confronts the marine engineer when he has mastered fundamental formulae and elementary principles, and begins to apply himself to practical problems.

Marine Corps Gazette • December 1957





The Glacier breaking ice in McMurdo Sound. Mt. Erebus in background. (Official U.S. Navy Photo)

## ***SMASHING THE ANTARCTIC ICE BARRIER*** ***with an 8,600-ton blow!***

To the Glacier, our Navy's largest and most powerful icebreaker, driving a path through ice up to 22 feet thick is all in the day's work. Here it is shown breaking a channel through 17 feet of solid ice at approximately 18 knots in Antarctica's McMurdo Sound as part of Operation Deep Freeze I and II. In view of the importance of communications at the bottom of the world, the Glacier is virtually a floating electronic laboratory. It contains nine AN/SRR-13A and seven AN/SRR-11 radio receivers, as well as two AN/SPA-YA Range Azimuth Indicators, one on the bridge and the other in the CIC. All of this RCA equipment has given continuous and dependable service, unaffected by the tremendous shocks to ship and gear, as 21,000-horsepower engines send the ship crashing forward under conditions never before faced by any icebreaker.



USS Glacier driving through pack ice in Ross Sea. (Official U.S. Navy Photo)



TMK(s) ®

DEFENSE ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS

**RADIO CORPORATION of AMERICA**

CAMDEN, N. J.

By Fred T. Stolley



☛ TAKE OUR BIG BASES TODAY, 29 Palms, Pendleton, Lejeune, Quantico, Cherry Point and others — we have a lot of land. Yet, if you use the range of some of our newer weapons as a standard, we haven't got half enough land to do our job.

But whether you think of it in terms of real estate, training areas for the FMF or test-fire ranges for the "Honest John," it's still land. And although we may have looked at it with a jaundiced eye primarily as a training aid, it didn't take long to find out that we were saddled with a secondary job of land and game management.

The problem of land management and game control has been recognized officially for some time. In the past few years new impetus has been put on the program with official directives setting up standards for maintaining grounds and others written to cover hunting, fishing and management and conservation of renewable natural resources.

In addition, the Secretary of the



Navy appointed an Ad Hoc Committee to study the problems of wildlife management and conservation of natural resources. The Secretary also requested a group of individuals to serve as a civilian advisory group to assist the Ad Hoc Committee in its work.

It seems slightly incongruous, on the face of it, to picture an area used for training purposes as land that produces a harvest. The thousands of troops ranging over the reservations, the impact areas with tangled smashed trees fringed by blackened, burnt-out areas do not conjure up visions of the forest primeval where the deer and the antelope play.

Yet, at Marine Corps Bases in the east, there is an annual tree harvest that gives the government a respectable return for its land investment and out west there are the grazing rights to consider. And at all bases, game control and supervision of the hunters and fishermen is now a routine problem of command.

Game must be considered a crop just like fruit, grain or timber and it should be harvested periodically or it will go to waste. A stocked pond that does not have enough fishing pressure will soon become overloaded with small stunted fish. Deer in a protected area will soon overpopulate the preserve and die of starvation. The U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service says today that 23% of the deer in the U.S. die of starvation.

There is a good harvest of game each year on Marine Corps reservations, but it was not always so. The game harvest came from a combination of the land management/conservation programs and the efforts of the Marines themselves who were interested in seeing better hunting and fishing on their reservations.

It has been a long-range program developed over the years. Talk to any of the Virginians around Quantico, for instance, and they will tell you that 10 years ago there were very few deer around and only an occasional turkey was sighted. Last year turkeys were plentiful and deer are becoming common enough to be a traffic hazard on the heavily travelled US Highway 1.

The increase represents the fruits of thousands of man-hours of work by Marines in their off-duty hours — work financed mainly by these same people, who dug deep to contribute the funds needed to keep the program going.

Actually, modern game management as we know it today is only about 20 years old in the U.S. It got its start through the Pittman-Roberts Act in 1934. When enacted, the act placed an excise tax on all sporting goods equipment and this money was used to finance the U. S. Fish and Wildlife's programs.

At Marine Corps bases there had been some work done by individuals and small groups before but the first

of the formalized programs in the field were started in 1948 with the formation of Rod & Gun Clubs and Sportsmen's Clubs at several Marine Corps Bases. Most commands then appointed Fish and Wildlife Committees to act as liaison between the sportsmen's groups and official agencies.

The biggest headache at the start and a problem that is still with us, was the budget and funding problems. Monies for the various projects planned, had to be scratched up by devious means but legal ones.

Over the years, some money has been allocated to game improvement programs from recreation funds but the bulk of the financial burden has been borne by the members of the Rod and Gun Clubs. Dues paid by the members went into a central fund that was implemented with the profits from fish fries, barbecues, buffalo roasts and other events sponsored by the clubs. Material assistance in the form of seed, fish for stocking and technical advice came from the Department of Interior and the various state fish and game commissions.

Technical advice is most important to the program. In conservation and land management work, there's no place for amateurs. An ill-advised program can create a Frankenstein monster like Australia's rabbit plague or start another pest colony comparable to the Starling and Eng-

# WILDLIFE CONSERVATION

**Good hunting and fishing on Marine Corps bases today**

**stems from sound land and game management programs**







**Migratory birds will come in if the food is there**

lish Sparrow hordes that inhabit our large cities.

Fortunately, the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior maintains regional offices throughout the US. Game technicians, fish and wildlife biologists, predator control technicians and government trappers are sent through the region from these headquarters to assist in the management of fish and wildlife within their assigned areas.

These persons do not do the actual work but will advise and teach, on the ground, the proper methods of planting feed plots and stocking streams and ponds. The States also render comparable services and all agencies of state and government are wholehearted and enthusiastic in their support of organized local programs.

These services are very important to the Marine Corps' land and game management programs because of the lack of continuity of personnel charged with implementing the long-range plans of the various bases. Rotation and transfers usually shift the personnel on the committees every few years. We lean on the federal and state agencies very heavily for assistance in keeping programs going.

But to get to the practical, it is not necessary to stock game in most areas of the US. The game is there, with enough breeding stock to build up a population, if sufficient feed and water are provided.

Creating a reservation itself is enough to increase wildlife in an

area. In the first place the hunting pressure is immediately reduced. It is obvious, that during the weeks when training problems are being run or firing is taking place on a range, no hunting can be allowed. The wildlife, quick to sense this, soon learn the difference between tactical firing and shots fired by hunters. In support of this statement you will find one of the best turkey areas at Quantico just back of one of the firing ranges.

The regular work, incident to putting a reservation in operation, is also a help. Water reservoirs guarantee an adequate water supply during the dry season and game must have water to exist. Erosion control, brush dams in dry washes, cover grasses planted on eroded slopes and other controls provide further cover and feed.

As the Public Works programs advance on the base, the Fish and Wildlife Committees must work with them in planning game improvement programs compatible to the construction.

In a typical Public Works project at an East Coast Marine Corps Base, some 9,000 acres of land were to be cleared for a maneuver area and a 650-acre reservoir was to be constructed.

The Government contract called for the cleared area to be seeded with perennial rye grass and though rye is considered to be a good cover crop it is not an annual. If not replanted every few years it is soon replaced by native grasses and weeds.

State and Government specialists recommended that some bicolor lespedeza be planted around the edge of the clearing and Korean lespedeza be planted through the rye to augment the cover crop. The Rod and Gun Club voted an appropriation

for seed for the project and it has been planted.

The reservoir presented a little more complicated problem. Before the dam was closed and water allowed to accumulate in the reservoir area, feeder streams had to be chemically treated to eliminate trash fish. Two or three weeks after treatment, water was allowed to accumulate in the basin and after the pond was tested to be sure the effects of the chemical had dissipated, the Fish and Wildlife Service made an initial stocking of pan fish. Next spring bass fry will be planted and from then on the growth and balance of the specie in the pond will be checked periodically for the next two years before the water is opened to fishing. The local Fish and Wildlife Committee coordinated and supervised the operation and members of the Rod and Gun Club assisted in the manual labor involved in the stocking.

After the pond fills, the Fish and Wildlife Service will be requested to examine the area and make recommendations to improve it as a migratory game bird and waterfowl habitat. In this case, after the survey is made the Rod and Gun Club will probably vote funds necessary to purchase seed and plants necessary to start a crop of food to attract the game birds to the area.

In other cases, sportsmen's clubs act independently on a project. At Camp Pendleton, because of the lack of water in many areas, there were few quail. The men got together and repaired the old windmills that had dotted the base when it was the old Santa Margarita ranch and cleared out springs so they would flow again. Brush dams were built in the dry washes to combat soil erosion and conserve what water fell



**Feed plots—Marines bought the seed and tilled the ground**



**Erosion control—a dry wash converted into a fish pond**

during the rainy season and at other spots Gallinaceous Guzzlers were built.

The "Guzzlers" are a unique contraption designed to provide water for the birds and provide protection for them while they are drinking. A sheet of black top is laid onto the slope of a hill to catch the rainwater and funnel it into a deep sump or well. The sump is covered to guard against evaporation but an opening is left at the side where the water runs in so the birds can get to the water. A series of bars screen the opening enough so that predators can't get in and the birds can drink in safety. The usual spring rains fill the "Guzzlers" with enough water to last through the dry season.

The program was rounded out by placing mechanical feeders at each watering spot and in a few years Camp Pendleton and the area surrounding abounded in game birds. The entire project was financed by the sportsmen's group.

It sounds easy—follow the blueprint and in a few years you'll have enough wildlife to populate a task force of Arks.

But the pattern doesn't include a graph showing the amount of man-hours involved needed to implement the program. For instance, a Navy Chief spent his weekends for two years operating a tractor and a bulldozer on the reservation. He cleared the land for feed plots and cut miles and miles of fire lanes through the underbrush. These lanes gave the game access to feeding areas never available before.

Then there was the Sergeant who spent all of his off-duty hours in stream improvement. He built rock dams across the streams in strategic areas where the water could be impounded, and cleared out feeder

springs along the water shed to insure a steady flow of fresh cold water to the streams.

At Camp Lejeune, at the present time, there are 125 acres planted in bicolor lespedeza with approximately 10,000 plants per acre in the feed plots. At the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, since 1948, 114 acres of food plots and 22 acres of feeder stockage plots have been established and are under cultivation. Over 300 turkey and squirrel feeders have been constructed and are stocked each year. Formal figures are not available for other bases at this time, but all Marine Corps Bases have comparable game improvement programs going. Someone had to do the work.

The work involved in these successful land management and game improvement plans was done by Marines in their off-duty hours. These were Marines who wanted to see good hunting and fishing on their reservations and they were willing to work for it. They were true sportsmen. They provided the labor, they provided the funds that bought the seed to put in the land and even the tractors necessary to till the ground.

So you till the ground and plant the seed and wait for the harvest. The Chief wants to get his deer and the Sergeant wants to fish. But there is an overall commitment for the entire base as a training area or a firing range, and the entire program must be coordinated with national and regional hunting and fishing laws.

In spite of a popular misconception, military bases do not have their own set of rules and do not set their own seasons and limits.

However, in a case where a base borders on two or more counties,

and includes land from more than one of those local shires, the state considers the base as an entity and, after annual surveys, sets up seasonal bag limits. Then the base can set up its own controls on hunting and fishing *but only in consonance with Federal and State game laws.*

It is obvious that close control must be maintained over hunters and fishermen on a military reservation. In the interests of public safety, there can be no free access to these training areas where live firing may be going on during the day and where "duds" present a constant danger. It can be safely stated today that on Marine Corps Reservations there is closer adherence to Federal and State game laws than there is on open ground. There is better control for good reason.

First, every Marine is cognizant of authority by reason of training and recognizes the necessity and reason for controls. Second, if he is a hunter or a fisherman, it is a 7 to 5 bet that he is a member of the local Rod and Gun Club and a true sportsman.

Additionally, he knows that he will pass control points going to the hunting/fishing area and coming back, and he also knows that the area is open to inspection by State and Federal game officials in addition to base game wardens. If he is caught violating base, State or Federal game regulations it can mean a court martial.

The Marine can't wander willy-nilly over the reservation taking potshots at anything that moves. But for the man who will join his local hunting and fishing organization there are great rewards. By complying with base regulations and going along cheerfully with the restrictions imposed on his movements by the exigencies of the service, thousands of acres of hunting lands and fishing waters will be his to explore.

His heritage will be the fruits of the labor of the thousands of Marines who contributed their time and money to conservation and game improvement programs.


But the Chief who spent his time putting in the feed plots and the Sergeant who worked improving the ponds and streams, know where the best spots are for getting your deer or filling your creel. Give them a hand with the spade work, and you'll know too.

US MC




# NEW CANADIAN ARMY VEHICLE

Photos and material courtesy Canadian Army Journal







A new light tracked-vehicle, designed for use by the Canadian Army in the far north, promises great improvement in cross-country travel for the armed forces.

Derived from the basic design of a vehicle produced by the Canadian Army, the small amphibious articulated vehicle was developed after 5 years of study and research.

During tests in deep snow, marshy ground, sand and water, the vehicle has lived up to expectations. During the course of a demonstration, the


vehicle, loaded with 600 lbs. of concrete blocks was driven up and down a 50 per cent slope, and then through 20 feet of water.

In tests conducted in northern Ontario, the carrier performed excellently in as much as 5 feet of powdery snow.

Highly maneuverable, the vehicle can be driven in a circle only 18 feet in diameter in deep snow. It is light enough to be man-handled if necessary. Weighing 1,500 lbs. the new Carrier is capable of carrying about

600 lbs. of cargo while towing an additional 1,000 lbs. on sleds or toboggans. It was designed primarily to lighten the load of troops training or fighting in the far north.

Built in 2 sections linked together, the vehicle has a small gasoline motor in the front section which, through a takeoff, powers the rear or cargo section. Both sections are tracked. Steering is accomplished by bending the vehicle in the middle by a system of steel cables attached to the steering column.





☛ *New lightweight radars* aboard the Navy's newest amphibious control craft (above) will help land assault troops on an enemy beach in fog or other conditions of zero visibility with pin-point accuracy.

☛ *The President has approved the Commandant of the Marine Corps' recommendation* for the redesignation of certain top level billets in order to simplify the organization of HQMC.

Under the new organization, the functions of the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps for Air, will be joined in a single office to be designated the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The functions of the Chief of Staff, heretofore combined with those of the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, will be placed in a separate office, that of the Chief of Staff, HQMC.

The newly designated Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps will hold the rank of Lieutenant General. He will perform the duties of the Commandant during the latter's absence or disability, and such other duties as the Commandant may specifically direct. The billet will be held by LtGen Verne J. McCaul.

The Chief of Staff, HQMC will also hold the rank of Lieutenant General.

MajGen Hogaboom, currently serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, HQMC, will be promoted and assigned to this billet.

The office of Director of Aviation, previously held by the Assistant Commandant for Air as a concurrent assignment, will be a separate office. This billet is to be filled by a general officer. He will be responsible to the CMC for planning, coordinating and supervising matters and activities pertaining to Marine Corps Aviation.

☛ *The Bell Automatic Carrier Landing System* has successfully completed all land trials and is installed aboard the USS *Antietam* (below) for actual carrier flight operations at sea. This system is completely automatic, highly mobile, and is a combination of radio and radar.

Radar locates the airplane and determines its altitude and position in relation to the carrier deck. An electronic computer does the rest, sending the necessary course corrections to a device which directs the airplane into the desired flight pattern. The system takes into account the carrier's movement. If the airplane is not in the best attitude for a safe landing, the system automatically sends the airplane around for another attempt.



☛ *A new right angle drive propulsion system* (above) for landing craft has satisfactorily completed its Navy acceptance trials. Fully steerable outboard propeller faces the bow of the craft (in picture) to demonstrate how it can rotate 360 degrees. This feature helps provide complete craft control in any direction under the most adverse conditions.

☛ *The Marine Corps* has adopted a lightweight radio set that can operate at ranges up to 10 miles. Several sets can be linked together as relay stations to transmit messages as much as 40 miles. They can be tied in to a switchboard for multiple distribution or communicate directly with other radios on the same channel. The new set is said to be ideal for use in helicopter assault operations.

☛ *Soldiers at Fort Lee, Va.* are getting their first taste of the Army's irradiated food, prepared and served as part of the regular mess hall meal in a troop acceptance test. Foods are selected and approved under the direction of the Quartermaster General and the Surgeon General of the Army. Two companies of troops on a voluntary basis are currently participating in the test.







**SANTA'S HELPERS.** Telephone operators Carolyn M. Kraatz and Arlene P. Halgin, of New York City, symbolize the country-wide spirit of Christmas giving.

## Telephone Folks Will Play Santa for Thousands of Kids

As you read this, telephone operators all over the country are dressing thousands of dolls for distribution to children's homes and hospitals at Christmas.

Throughout the Bell System, thousands of other telephone men and women are col-

lecting food, candy, toys and dollars for those less fortunate than themselves.

It's a telephone tradition—and a natural one. The spirit of service and the spirit of Christmas are close together. And telephone folks try to be good citizens all year 'round.

Working together to bring people together... **BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM**







STAND ASIDE, YOU NEW AND OLD breeds, here comes the man you will be fighting alongside in the next war—the legislated breed. He's already adding strength to our ranks. At the same time he's causing some headaches in the Corps which will probably get worse before they im-

*Ed: This is the 3rd of a 4 part article.*

*Chapter IV will appear in the Jan. issue.*



prove.

Never in the history of the Corps has there been anything quite like the legislated breed and it is going to be sometime before everybody gets used to having him around. Right now he is still a youngster, but by the end of 1959 he'll have out-

grown his britches and all his equipment. This is going to prove a mighty problem on the Corps' usually truncated budget—more of that later.

Who is the legislated breed? He is the product of the perilous times in which we find ourselves; times





*Relief map used to instruct Santa Monica, Cal. Reserves*

which demand a larger military force for security than this country can support. The product, so to speak, of a shotgun wedding back in 1952 of Regular and Reserve service. This was accomplished by legislation and complicated by just about every pressure group in the country.

Up to now his childhood has been a stormy one. First he was given some blessings, then loaded with tasks, and it is almost certain that Congress will add on a few more chores.

Nobody is satisfied with the poor kid. Plans for his upbringing have been tossed back and forth between the Defense Department and the Congress for the past 4 years, and during this time the public press has belabored everybody impartially for having created something presently pretty generally known as the "un-ready reserve."

Un-ready or not, great things are expected of the all services' reserves and in a hurry. How well our own expanding Marine Corps Reserve produces in a future emergency depends a great deal on how well we take care of the legislated breed; how well we understand and train him. From a standpoint of numbers, our Reserve right now is much larger than the Regular establishment. Not all of these are required to train and, in the last fiscal year, only about 17 per cent actually attended some form of training. But, before too long the Reserve is going to get considerably larger and a major portion will have to be trained under laws passed in the last session of Congress. Obviously the legislated breed looms large in any pro-

jected plans for the Corps, so let's see what makes him tick.

To clearly understand this legislated breed we must go back and see what has been developing during the past few years. We have covered the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 and the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. It was but a short time after this act went into effect before the shortcomings thereof became very apparent. It was also noted by many of our leaders that the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 was not bringing the results expected.

While the subject of universal military training, or national security training—call it what you may—has been before the American public, off and on, for over 30 years, it was never really seriously considered until the Korean emergency vividly illustrated the cost to the nation of the lack of a military training system, in terms of human unfairness and military unpreparedness. Our reservists of WW II began to talk about "double jeopardy," a term seldom used before this era other than in the legal profession. It has now become a household expression.

Between WW II and Korea, about 4,500,000 young men came of military age; about 1,100,000 saw service through being inducted or enlisting. Nearly 3,500,000 did nothing. Some of these, about 900,000, would have been 4-F under present standards; but the balance were fit in every way for military service, and yet were required neither to train nor to serve. As a result, when Korea came and we were required to mobilize rap-

idly, we had no source of trained manpower to tap; no men who could be used quickly, except the veterans of WW II, who still had a reserve obligation even though it was not realized by a great many of them.

About 986,000 Reserves were recalled for Korea, over two-thirds of them being recalled in the first year, many in the first month. Between 600,000 and 700,000 of these, or about 70 per cent, were veterans of WW II. The report by the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on the status of the Reserve indicates that probably more than half of all those recalled were Inactive Reservists in a non-pay status.

These veteran reservists, when recalled to duty, were fathers, essential workers, scientists, technicians, college students, farmers, apprentices and just plain men earning a living. They were recalled to service regardless of any of these situations which might have deferred them from initial induction. At the same time, men, younger than they, who had never served their country before, were either exempt or deferred from induction because they were fathers, essential workers, scientists, technicians, college students, farmers, and apprentices.

As a result of this situation and the many reports and studies in reference thereto, Washington became a variable whirlpool of nebulous thinking, tangent reflections and just plain asininity. From this period of mental gymnastics, in reference to Reserve matters, at long last grew a more or less solid mass of doctrine, scripture, or conceded policy. Out of this great mass of endeavor came the "new look" at the Reserve program which in turn was developed into the National Reserve Plan, and finally the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. However, it must be noted that any semblance between the plan that went into Congress and the act that came out was purely coincidental.

To understand the National Reserve Plan one must go back to the late summer of 1953. The President on 1 August 1953 requested the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) to submit a definitive report on the availability of manpower simultaneously to operate National Security Training (NST), to supply military personnel for active service, and to



meet the needs of the civilian economy. This report to indicate clearly what the impact of NST would be on our manpower requirements for agricultural, scientific, professional, technical and skilled personnel. The director of ODM appointed an *ad hoc* committee to assist in the evaluation of facts on manpower resources and in formulation of certain recommendations. This Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security was under the chairmanship of Mr. Lawrence A. Appley, president of the American Management Association.

The President, also on 1 August 1953, requested the chairman of the National Security Training Commission (NSTC) to report on the general subject of National Security Training. Both reports were called for by 1 December.

The National Security Training Commission report (commonly known as the Adler report) covers some 160 pages. Basically, it states our need for as universal a system of training and service as can be achieved, *right now*, because of 2 factors: the inadequacy of our "paper reserve" to the dangers of the time, and the sobering fact that in another limited emergency we would have to call veterans back to service for the second and third times for lack of a nonveterans reserve. They reported that we must train nonveterans so they will be available for duty ahead of veterans in another limited emergency. We learned in Korea what happens in the absence of such nonveteran training; but not until after the services had enough time to begin producing from their regular training programs an adequate flow of trained nonveterans,

ready to move into the fighting lines, was the inequity of double jeopardy for the veterans stemmed. This report stated that the solution to the unfairness to veterans is also the solution to our mobilization need for Reserves. In other words, have enough nonveterans available to defend the nation during the early stages of another emergency while nonveterans inducted at the beginning of the emergency are being trained.

All our wars have been fought by citizen soldiers. Our Regular Establishment has provided top leadership and adequate basic military doctrines, but we have not clearly understood that the now famous WW II Reserve units of civilian soldiers found it necessary (except in the Marine Corps) to train from one to two years before they went to the field of battle. We cannot count on another like period of grace.

The commission reported that the Reserve system at that time was unsatisfactory, and that to vitalize our Reserves we must give reservists pre-training to bring them to a state of readiness that will qualify them for quick deployment in an emergency. To do this it was proposed to give every boy, when he reaches 18 years of age, a 6 months period or 1,050 hours, of basic training, and after that to transfer him to the Ready or Organized Reserve for 4½ or 7½ years. This training was to be carried on concurrently with the 2 year draft, the placement of individuals to be determined by lot.

The *ad hoc* committee, on the other hand, did not concur with the thinking of the National Security Training Commission, nor their report to the President. This commit-

tee, commonly known as the Appley Committee on Manpower Resources, was directed by the Office of Defense Mobilization to conduct a threefold study: First, to determine, under then current conditions, whether there is sufficient manpower in the military age group to maintain armed forces of approximately current planned strength and to conduct simultaneously a national security training program. Second, to determine the availability of manpower for enlarged armed forces under conditions of stepped-up partial mobilization, or of full mobilization, while meeting the essential needs of the national economy, and third, to review present military manpower procurement policies and procedures to evaluate their impact on the availability of manpower to meet other national security needs.

For study purposes, 1953-1960 was chosen as the base period—long enough to bring out the major manpower problems facing us—since the decade of the 50's represents the low point in our population curve.

With regard to the first of these three purposes, "to determine, under current conditions, whether there is sufficient manpower in the military age group to maintain armed forces of approximately current planned strength and to conduct simultaneously a national security training program," the Appley committee concluded:

1) It appears that, assuming the armed forces strength is not materially increased, sufficient numbers are available for initiating the type of training program envisaged by the present UMT&S Act with at least 100,000 men a year. The committee made it explicit that this finding must not be taken as any implication that it favored the concurrent operation of a national security training program and a selective service program.

2) Greater national security will be found in avoiding a dual system, since the availability of manpower for 2 concurrent programs of procurement and training is uncertain over a period of some years.

3) Based on current experience with respect to enlistments, reenlistments and rejections, sufficient manpower is *not* available under present law and regulations to maintain armed forces at the present level con-



**Grenade practice — Camp Pendleton, California**



### *Listen — Learn — Practice*

currently with a token national security training program of even 100,000 trainees per year.

With regard to the second purpose of the study, "to determine the availability of manpower for enlarged armed forces, under conditions of stepped-up partial mobilization, or full mobilization, while meeting the essential needs of the national economy," the committee concluded:

1) It is reasonable to suppose that the manpower requirements could be met for this level of mobilization without causing shortages of non-specialized manpower which would seriously retard the reaching of production goals.

2) To achieve and maintain armed forces of 5,000,000 men, certain changes would have to be made in the UMT&S Act, selective service regulations and legislation relating to Reserve forces.

3) By adopting one or more of several alternative measures, such as the extension of terms of service for all men in the armed services for a period of one year, and adjustments in deferment policies, the expansion of the armed forces to 5,000,000 men, and the continued maintenance at that level, though difficult, is feasible in manpower terms.

4) The margin of skilled manpower for war production is extremely narrow in the light of modern requirements. For full mobilization it is necessary that an effective procurement and allocation process be developed and ready for immediate use. This system must be so designed as to assure that persons possessing skills in short supply should be allocated between civilian and military activities in a manner which

enables them to make their maximum contribution to the national effort.

5) Under full mobilization the proper distribution of men with critical skills will be one of the decisive factors in determining the effective strength of the armed forces and the adequacy of civilian support of military operations. Our resources of highly trained manpower will probably be the ultimate limiting factor in our capacity for mobilization. Also there must be full exploitation of the abilities of women, of people of marginal mental and physical faculties, and people over age 37.

With respect to the third purpose of the study, "to review present military manpower procurement policies and procedures, and, to evaluate their impact on the availability of manpower to meet other national security needs," the committee concluded that:

1) When viewed from the standpoint of manpower for all national security purposes, the present organization of the Reserves and policies for their call-up to active duty in an emergency are open to question.

2) To achieve maximum availability of manpower for military and civilian activities in an emergency, certain basic changes in military manpower procurement policies are necessary.

3) There should be an "immediately callable reserve," size to be determined by the National Security Council, subject to call by the military services and adequately screened to assure that no significant attrition would occur at time of call and that no serious impairment would be caused to supporting research, development, or production.

4) There should be a "selectively callable reserve" consisting of all reservists except members of the "immediately callable reserve" subject to selective recall by the Selective Service System based on occupational and equity factors considered on an individual basis.

5) The most important modification which should be made in the procurement of man power through the Selective Service System is provision for the induction of men on the basis of military needs for critical civilian skills.

6) A systematic means for assuring the proper distribution of men having critical skills is necessary. The first step in this process is the projection of military requirements for men with critical civilian skills. Only upon the basis of the realistically determined needs of the military services can there be an intelligent allocation of men with critical skills between military and civilian activities.

7) Those men for the "selectively callable reserve" who have no critical skills should be called to duty under general calls placed with the Selective Service System by the Department of Defense. Those who do have critical skills should be called selectively on the basis of military need for their military or civilian skills.

8) The initial allocation of manpower between the military and civilian activities should continue to be made by the President in consultation with the National Security Council.

The ODM report, based upon the results of the 2 studies, NSTC and Appley Report, and looking toward the ultimate presentation to the



Congress of a comprehensive program designed to strengthen our military Reserve and at the same time enable the civilian labor force to make its maximum contribution to our national security, contained the following recommendations:

1) That the National Security Council, on the basis of recommendations by the Department of Defense, determine the size and composition of military Reserve forces needed to meet current and future national security requirements.

2) That the Department of Defense prepare for the consideration of the NSC a program for the establishment of an "immediately callable reserve" and a "selectively callable reserve," each of appropriate size and composition.

3) That the Department of Defense prepare for the consideration of NCS, a training program for the "immediately callable reserve."

4) That pending a determination of the size, composition and training of our Reserve forces, and decision on the recommendations to put into effect the universal military training provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, be held in abeyance.

Following these reports the Secretary of Defense appointed a special task force headed by MajGen W. W. Wensinger, USMC, to prepare the position of the services as regards these matters as well as to take an overall look at our Reserve program and to make such other recommendations in connection therewith as they deemed appropriate. A 15 March 1954 deadline was established for transmission of these positions to the Office of Defense Mobilization.

This task force on Reserve mobilization was composed of the following officers: MajGen Walter W. Wensinger, USMC, director; MajGen William E. Hall, USAF; RAdm Kenmore M. McManes, USN; and BGen Rinaldo Van Brunt, USA, members. The Coast Guard was represented by RAdm James A. Hirshfield, USCG.

The report of this task force contained 146 pages; 41 pages of which contained the force report and 105 pages gave the various service positions.

After the receipt of the Wensinger Report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ap-

pointed an *ad hoc* committee which reviewed all of these many reports and studies and made independent and secret reports to the Secretary of Defense and the President on certain phases of the problem.

Following this, the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization submitted their reports to the National Security Council and the President. After the National Security Council and the Office of the President considered these reports, many requests for further information were submitted to the Secretary of Defense and the services which resulted in a new plan known as the Department of Defense-Office of Defense Mobilization position on military manpower programs-reserve mobilization requirements.

After many more conferences within and between services, boards, committees, *ad hoc* and otherwise, and no small amount of service comments along the way, there evolved what is known as the National Reserve Plan.

This plan was finally submitted to the Congress. Thereafter many more hearings (beginning 8 February 1955) were attended by college professors, labor leaders, industrial giants, religious leaders of all faiths, and no small numbers from the various services. This bill was rewritten 5 times before it completed its tempestuous voyage through the houses

of Congress and became law on 9 August 1955.

The law, known as the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, did not contain many of the very important provisions of the plan and it came as somewhat of a disappointment to the President, the Department of Defense, and many of the services. The Marine Corps did not feel that we needed any more legislation and were not affected too much by the Act itself; however, we were vitally affected by the overall attitude of the people throughout the United States.

There had been much publicity in regard to the general situation to the effect that some kind of an act on the Reserve program was about to come out of Congress. The result was that most people took on a "wait and see" attitude, and were not about to join any program until they found out just what it would require. As you may well imagine, recruiting reached an all time low. Even after the act became law there was much confusion, and the long delay in publishing directives and instructions resulted in a further slump in recruiting as well as general misunderstanding. It was very evident that the era of Reserve by force was upon us and the type of man that we want in the Marine Corps Reserve just did not like it. Even to this day recruiting is our most severe problem, and much of it can be traced directly to this act.

It is my considered opinion that what we need most is education, not legislation. The old expression that "you can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink" is still valid, and history has proven that if you try to force the human animal you've got a job on your hands. In this regard it is noted that if you tell a child not to put raisins up his nose that is exactly what he is going to do, even though he had never thought of it before that time. If you tell a man he must not drink whiskey he will drink more than he wants and will pay any price to obtain same. And, if you tell a man he must do military duty he will seek every means possible—and there are ways and means—to avoid it. The American boy can be led to great heights of achievements, but, if you push him you will find he's a damn stubborn critter.

USMC



Mapping class — 11th EngBn, Baltimore, Md.





## OBSERVATION POST

### ABOUT CHOPPERS— BE MOBILE

✱ Ever since the helicopter came into general use on the squadron level, planners and pilots alike have been searching for ways to best utilize this "cavalry of the air." With 2 new types of helicopters being introduced into the Marine Corps, planners and pilots should step back and take a look at how they are going to use these new "whirlybirds." The only way to intelligently plan use of the new "birds" is to evaluate the results which have been obtained from the old ones.

Have we imaginatively used our choppers in the past? Have we imaginatively planned and practiced uses for our helicopters? Adherents of the "we've-done-the-best-we-can" school say that there is little more training that could be done on a squadron level and still stay within fund allocations. Then let's discount those desired activities which would require more money to accomplish.

No, we won't require more money, but let's just see if we've done the best we can with what we've got. A good way to examine planning is in the way it is reflected in training at squadron level. Take a look at activities for a year. Probably wherever a chopper squadron is, it will participate in at least 2 TRAEXS with ground troops and other fixed wing squadrons. This training is valuable and has become fairly routine. Take a mythical squadron MARHELTRANSRON (LIGHT) 863 picks up a company of troops, their weapons and support equipment and deposits them some miles away, supports them from this point (D-Day) until D-Day plus one or 2 or 3 and then administratively returns them to their base whereupon the TRAEX is over. It is believed that 863 should participate in a TRAEX and supports *itself* for 3 or 4 days.

Consider what has come to be the ideal war time situation involving vertical envelopment. Chopper squadron 863 lifts its company from a helicopter carrier to shore, along with its support personnel and equipment. Now it supports them for 2 or 3 days, and of course

it supports itself, hauling, when it is to be shore based, its own support equipment. Food, parts, water, etc., are supplied by choppers. And it better hurry getting that equipment to shore because the carrier may have to pull out any minute.

Aerial resupply by helicopter? Old hat? Possibly, but in how many TRAEXS has this been practiced; that is, helicopter support of helicopters for a period of one to 3 days after D-Day? The problems are many and it is remarkable that more of this hasn't been done.

For example, how many crewmen and pilots know how to fasten rotor blades on the side of an HRS for transport? What will be the precedence of, supply from a ship that may have to move at any minute? Gas, oil, maintenance supplies? How much duplication of supplies and equipment are you going to have so that equipment and supplies can be given to the squadron even when some of the choppers are lost to the enemy? Let's try it and find out.

Another major point which is reflected in our struggle to combine planning (on the upper levels) and utilizing (on the squadron levels) concerns several major operational inconsistencies which seem to result from approaching rotary-wing problems from a fixed-wing standpoint. This must cease if imaginative planning is to be successful.

For example, HRS helicopters are restricted from instrument flights, yet simulated instrument flight time minimums must be logged each fiscal year. Further, while specific weather minimums are practical and indicated for fixed wing aircraft, they are often impractical and not indicated for helicopters which are capable of landing literally anywhere. The weather minimums for a helicopter squadron should be much more flexible than for fixed wing aircraft.

Another facet which reflects the need for approaching helicopter problems flexibly, is the loading problem. HRS helicopters have an allowed maximum gross weight of X pounds. Yet when the weather is cold or the wind is blowing fairly hard, a much greater load can be carried. Look how this can affect you.

Eight helicopters have to lift 200 men 10 miles. A round trip takes perhaps 20 minutes. In planning, 5 men are assigned to each helicopter. This would mean that it would take one hour and a half to get all of the troops to their destination (5 trips). The Commanding Officer of the troops to be lifted has a serial made up for every man, showing what plane he is to get on and on what lift.

How uneconomical and unfortunate if D-Day should be colder or windier than anticipated, so that just one more man can safely be added to each heli-team. This means that in 4 trips (70 minutes) all but 8 men could be placed at their destination and these 8 could probably be placed in the fourth lift as a compensation for burned up fuel. This one extra man could be the difference between a won and lost battle. Rarely in training today do we see this type of last minute mobility employed, however, often if for no other reason than that the serials would be disrupted.

One other matter concerning loading: HRS helicopters, as with all helicopters, have a very marginal loading problem. It is felt that in general practice today they are underloaded. Without getting down to specific pounds and weather conditions (which greatly affect loading) it is felt that a chopper's payload could be increased by at least one Marine or his equivalent. Deterrents of an apparently petty suggestion such as this say that in time of war we can do that sort of thing—but be safe now. The author says practice it now. It is just as safe and can get the man to his destination much quicker, percentage wise. The faster transport is completed, the better it is for the troops.

This conclusion opens up a whole new field of thought. Fixed wing squadrons pay a fantastic amount of attention to flight safety, and well they might. Helicopter squadrons are not different; however, with maximum utilization and training as an end, it is felt that a more practical approach to safety, as applied to choppers, should be attained. It is important to note here that the author is not deterring from aviation safety, but instead thinks it possible the safety pendulum has reached the point of diminishing returns. Judge from the following examples:

1) In time of war low level flying at tree top level will be necessary to avoid being shot down. Can it be practiced today? Not legally. Below 500 feet, it is claimed, such flight is unsafe and also violates OpNav orders. There is more to low level navigation than meets the eye, and it is submitted that continual low level dead reckoning navigation

training would be of much value. Safe emergency landings can be made from a very low altitude as well as from 500 feet. Solution: Be mobile and change the rules as they apply to choppers.

2) HRS helicopters are required to maintain a large fuel reserve, larger than is considered practical. Why? No good reason seems apparent outside of suspected innaccuracy on present fuel gauges (a suspicion that is without foundation when routine maintenance and calibration is performed). This weight penalty could mean the difference between carrying another Marine or going a little farther. In fixed wing aircraft, large fuel minimums are required in order to allow the plane to get to a secondary destination. Choppers do not ordinarily need an alternate destination. Solution: Reduce excess-fuel requirements to a point consistent with practical flight safety.

3) The way most time is wasted in a practice troop lift is on the ground, strapping the troops to their seats. Time is of the essence in a troop lift. If 200 men are to be lifted and 30 seconds to one minute is wasted on each man (besides tying up heli-ground crews already short handed) it is apparent that the loading time factor becomes the bottleneck in transport. Solution: Return to one flight safety belt for one entire seat. It is just as safe and provides relief from a confusion of buckles and belts.

All of the above ideas and suggestions should be used only as examples of the main point. Rotary-wing aircraft require a different approach in many ways than fixed wing aircraft. Mobility is a key word and without it complete utilization is not attained. Imaginative planning is the key word and without it, in the future, helicopters to come will not take advantage of the discoveries of choppers of the past.

1st Lt. W. W. Crawford

## READINESS THROUGH COMPETITION AND RECOGNITION

✿ HQTRS US EUCOM—The Marine Corps GAZETTE in 1956 printed more articles pertaining to leadership, esprit, morale, traditions and discipline than on any other subject. They all had ideas on how to raise the morale, instill spirit, increase prestige, broaden imagination, promote initiative and all in all how to raise our standards to where we are always ready. Let's do it through competition and recognition.

Colonel Prickett, in his article *Old Corps* (GAZETTE: July '56) said of old corps platoon leaders and their men "the daily competition welded them into units that depended on each other"

and "generally, each company commander had his own ideas"—The answer is there—the competition and the idea let the commander use his ideas.

First, I believe that such a competitive program must be established by HQMC so that it is law. Some commanders just don't like competition and as LtCol Drakely says in his article, "Physical Fitness" (GAZETTE: Sept '56); "It was evident that getting such a program started would require a tremendous initial thrust to overcome the inertia and indifference of a generation geared to push buttons and foam rubber cushions." I would establish the following program to be included in all unit training directives. In discussing a program I am thinking of infantry companies competing in an infantry battalion, however I feel a similar program could be established by any unit and *should be* by those who know best.

The program should include 1) Inspections, 2) A field events day, 3) Competitive drill, 4) Physical fitness test and 5) Tactical problems. It should run monthly and be based on a 20 point per "event"—100 point total basis. I would set it up as follows:

1) Inspections should be conducted once a week by the battalion commander or his representative. There should be 4 each month and a maximum of 5 points awarded each week. The inspections would include at least one display of clothing and equipment on the bunk—checked thoroughly to determine the company's readiness to move out.

2) The field events should be carefully selected so as to include events that all companies have to be proficient in. I would digress to the point of including events such as log cutting, pie eating, etc., perhaps make this day the one to be concluded with a battalion smoker. The winner of this and the other monthly events would gain 20 points. Second, third places, etc., would be awarded points determined by the number of units participating but all should be recognized.

3) The competitive drill should be right out of the manual and set up so as to test the proficiency of squad leaders, platoon leaders, etc. I would also include guard mounts and other ceremonies requiring small unit participation.

4) No physical fitness test can be devised that is any better or more demanding than the one set forth in FM 21-20. The test is excellent and produces amazing results once the men start competing against each other. We initiated this program in this tri-service guard "company" I have here at HQTRS US EUCOM and I expect at least 20 percent of the 75 men (25 Air Force, 25

Army, 25 Marines) to score 100 points in each of the events when the final test is administered. The men like it and keep in shape for "record day."

5) The tactics problem should be set up by the S-3 to progress from squad up through company tactics. I feel this portion of the competition would stimulate interest far beyond any weekly training order. It would set forth an objective, and to be good—a company commander would have to train for it.

Now we have half the program; the other half is the *recognition*. I say half because this is actually where the competition pays off! What are we going to give to the *best of the best*?

Again I say—start it at headquarters—establish a Marine Corps wide readiness Flag—designed, I would suggest, like the guidon except with a solid red field and a large gold "R" for "readiness" in the center. This flag would be presented once a month to the ready company—to be flown in front of the barracks. A streamer—red with the "R" could also be presented at the same time, and carried at all times with the guidon. Some trophy or plaque should be made available to present to a unit winning the flag a certain consecutive number of times. This plaque should be mounted in the company area and inscribed accordingly. Other trophies could be conceived by the battalion and company commanders such as one for high point man in physical fitness, leadership ability in the tactical problem, individual performance in the field events day and so on. I would also afford the ready company extra privileges. They should be the ones to get the long weekend (regardless of current policy or how often they win it). They should be the ones selected to represent the Marine Corps at public functions—They are ready, They are the best.

Once a program such as this is started imaginations start working overtime—morale shoots up because the men begin cooperating in a common effort to be the best. The prestige and pride is gained through *winning* and self confidence is developed through improving. MSgt Crumb said (GAZETTE: Nov '56) "that every leader from the corporal to the commander should avail himself of every opportunity to point out to the Marines around him that they are Marines, that they are the best, they must look the best and act the best at all times."

Yes, but let's make them compete, compete and compete until they are truly the best. I honestly feel that every good Marine is a competitor and if he possesses a real esprit de corps he'll devote himself to supporting a program that will make him ready!

Capt J. W. P. Robertson







# Algerian War

Is the Algerian War setting a pattern for future limited wars? Here is an eye witness account of this war by an experienced officer

By Col Victor J. Croizat

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS currently spending over four million dollars per day to support more than 400,000 troops in action in Algeria. Yet France is engaged only in a limited war. A war with no front and few battles, where the enemy is everywhere and combat is brief, personal and deadly. This is the type of war the Commandant of the Marine Corps spoke of on 14 June 1957 when he told members of the Secretary of Defense Conference at Quantico, Virginia:

"... the dominant military fact of the present world situation is that increasing emphasis must devolve on the capacity to fight and win wars for limited objectives, in limited areas, employing limited means."

It is not our purpose here to discuss either the geography or the complex political issues at stake in Algeria. However, there can be little understanding of military operations without some reference to terrain and to the political factors which influence operations. To satisfy this requirement a brief background of Algeria is provided.

Algeria is a large country; about the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. Yet in spite of its expanse, there is only about 10 per cent of it which is sufficiently well watered to support a significant population. On these 80,000 square miles live most of Algeria's nine million people.

The country borders the Mediterranean for over 600 miles. Along this California-like coast are scattered plains covered with vineyards, olive groves and many fruit orchards. It is on these coastal plains that the French, Spanish and Italians came to clear the land, drain the marshes, and form the many settlements where live the majority of the one million Europeans, 80 per cent of whom are now Algerian born.

The Tell Atlas Mountains limit the depth of these fertile plains and form a barrier parallel to the coast. These are rugged mountains rising to a height of 7,500 feet east of Algiers. In this area live some 800,000 Berbers whose isolation in Kabylia have kept many from ever learning Arabic. To the south is the High



Photos supplied by author.  
Artwork drawn from photos  
provided by the author





Plateau, a flat monotonous land, home of the nomad. In eastern Algeria, where the High Plateau narrows, the area becomes the granary of modern Algeria as it was that of Rome. Here today the rolling fields of wheat recall the eastern part of the State of Washington. In this area are found extensive ruins of Roman cities, preserved as well as Pompeii and far grander in scale. These long abandoned centers, now inhabited only by lizards and migratory storks, testify to the ancient and long standing link between Europe and North Africa.

Parallel to the Tell Atlas and separating the High Plateau from the desert is the southern branch of the Atlas mountains, the Saharan Atlas. Across this arid range begins the desert, a strange and desolate land crossed by unarmed vehicles only as recently as 1926. This vast inland sea of rock and sand appears to be on the threshold of a new life. The discovery of oil and other mineral wealth holds much promise for future expansion and adds yet an-

other complicating factor to those already perplexing the French.

This geography of Algeria exerts an obvious influence on the conduct of military operations. On the coastal plains and on the eastern High Plateau the military problem is primarily one of augmenting the regular police forces. Towns and cities must be patrolled, the dense population kept under surveillance; the civil and military installations protected. Fighting in these areas is against individuals and small groups who by terroristic actions attempt to keep the people in turmoil.

The Atlas mountains are the routes of rebel supply. Here the military problem is more conventional. There is extensive ground and aerial patrolling, and combat, when it occurs, is directed against larger rebel formations and their shifting bases. The rebels strike from the mountains and it is there the French army seeks to strangle their lines of communication and destroy their organization.

One of the important political fac-

tors is that the people of Algeria are not homogenous. Long Arab domination has brought Islam to the majority, but there have been struggles between the different Moslem sects which have not all disappeared today. The Berbers, the original inhabitants of Algeria, vary from blue eyed and fair skinned people to the dark so-called Semitic Arab type. Among the Arabs some are nomads, many are small farmers, and several hundreds of thousands work in factories and other commercial enterprises in Algeria and in France. Of significance is the fact that the native population has tripled between 1856 and 1936; the period which coincides with the extension of French control over the country.

The European element itself has varied origins. The French have blended with the Spaniard and Italian to produce the European Algerian who is French in both language and loyalties. This vigorous minority group is mainly engaged in commercial activity and only 30 per cent are farmers. It is this European



group which remains hostile to any solution of the current struggle which would give to the Mohammedan Algerian political supremacy over the European Algerian.

It has been claimed that the administrative structure of Algeria makes it actually a part of France. This is only partially true. The densely populated coastal areas have long been organized into three Departments corresponding to those of France. These were broken up into twelve Departments in 1956 to bring, so the French proclaim, the administrators closer to the administered. Moreover since 1947 there has been an Algerian Assembly of two Colleges; each of 60 members and a government council to assist the Resident General. But even with these palliatives, Algeria is really run from Paris. The desert area of three quarters of a million square miles is divided into four Regions administered by the military under the Resident General.

In November of 1954 a series of terroristic acts in the Department of Constantine marked the opening of the rebellion. Since that time there has been a gradual extension of the conflict to the point where now all of Algeria, to a depth of some 300 miles from the coast, is involved. The rebel forces have continued to grow in spite of French suppressive efforts. This increase can be attributed in great part to the support which the rebels are obtaining through the neighboring countries of Tunisia and Morocco.

While the rebels speak of an "army" there is little evidence to support such a claim. The 24,000 "regulars" are at best lightly armed, poorly equipped and their training is essentially rudimentary. The 30,000 additional "irregulars" who support the National Liberation Army are armed with shotguns and have little resemblance to a military organization. The rebels have established a territorial administrative division of Algeria. In these areas they have designated leaders and assigned forces. However, the effectiveness of such an organization is questionable and certainly rebel military operations do not appear to be coordinated.

The rebels fight mainly from am-



bush. Their equipment and training is such that they cannot risk a pitched battle with the French unless the latter are greatly outnumbered. They attack convoys and patrols with sufficient regularity and success to make the French military themselves an additional source of badly needed equipment. There have been surprisingly few attempts at sabotage and those which have taken place have been almost all confined to cutting the railroad.


The objectives of the FLN (Front de la Liberation Nationale), the political party behind the rebellion, are apparently to assimilate or destroy all other Algerian political parties; to gain the support of the people in order to obtain funds and recruit men; and to drive the French out. The FLN have been ruthless in their tactics not only against the French military but also against any natives who support the French or fail to contribute to the FLN.

The mission of the French forces is twofold. First to cut off the flow of supplies which cross the frontiers for the rebels; and secondly to pacify the country. Pacification is to be achieved by controlling the land and the people, a task which the French government has decided will be carried out with minimum destruction of life and property. The people, whose support the French must have if they are eventually to gain a favorable outcome in their struggle, cannot be further alienated by large scale military operations. It is for this reason that the full potential of the French forces in Algeria cannot be realized. Napalm cannot be used, and area destruction weapons such as artillery and aerial bombs are employed only with care. The French do not call this a war but "maintenance of order." It is this politically inspired reason for limiting the violence of war that makes the French military task so difficult.



**Col Croizat** was commissioned in the Marine Corps after graduating from Syracuse University in 1940. He commanded "A" Co, 1st Amph Trac Bn, and "M" Co, 3d Bn, 5th Marines at Guadalcanal. He commanded the 10th Amph Trac Bn at Roi Namur, Saipan, Tinian and Iwo Jima. After attending the French War College in 1949 and 1950, he returned to Quantico where he instructed in the tactics section, Senior School. From 1954 to 1956, he served in Indochina and has just returned from Algeria where his observations resulted in this article.





In general the deployments of French forces correspond to the degree of rebel activity and to the density of population. The natives cooperate with the French only if troops are actually present to provide security from rebel retribution. The towns and villages and the European Algerians also depend upon troops for protection. The long borders must be patrolled if they are to be effectively denied to the rebels. This combination of circumstances makes for a wide dispersal of French troops over the whole of the north. It may even be necessary at times for the troops to accept tactically disadvantageous deployments in order for them to fulfill the mission of providing security for the people and for vital civil and military installations. It is readily apparent that such dispersed deployments imply a decentralization of control. Commanders of zones, sectors and sub-sectors, corresponding respectively to divisions', regiments' and battalions' areas of responsibility, enjoy considerable freedom of action.

The French have learned that their major problem is finding the enemy. This problem is implicit in any ground combat operation. However, it assumes unusual importance

in guerrilla warfare where the enemy is fluid. The problem is not purely the classic one of gaining contact and fixing the enemy while suitable forces are deployed for attack; the problem is actually more subtle. The French utilize all possible means to discover the rebel. They rely most heavily on native informers. Yet this information, valid as it frequently is, must always be carefully evaluated. This in turn requires close collaboration between the military and the local police and other civil authorities; it requires extensive files and voluminous dossiers on local inhabitants. There must also be applied an understanding of the natives' psychology which in turn can be exploited to permit the orientation of the people towards a support of French objectives. In the purely military intelligence field, finding the rebel means constant ground and aerial patrolling. It means using individuals and units in the same areas, each day for days on end. Minor changes which would escape the new observer can then be readily identified. An increase in the numbers of cattle observed may be the clue to an enemy concentration; clothing spread out to dry on unusual days and not in conformity with known

routine may indicate a rebel force. In one case a French aerial observer noted that in a certain village there were a few houses where the surrounding grounds had been swept. This, to his trained eye, indicated something unusual because such cleanliness was not a characteristic of the local inhabitants. He reported that some French trained army deserters had possibly moved into town. A ground patrol quickly confirmed this suspicion with the result that a few more rebels were captured.

The Algerian war is revealing that the intelligence effort must be unusually extensive. The solution has not been found in any great increase of technically trained intelligence personnel but rather in broadening the appreciation of the intelligence problem in combat unit leaders. The objective is not to produce well written and well documented intelligence reports; the enemy moves too quickly and disappears too readily for these to have other than historical value. Combat units must be prepared to organize and operate local information gathering activities; and they must be able to evaluate and exploit the information they gain with least delay. The French

have also learned that they must be prepared to alter, or even cancel, well conceived operation plans when the information on the rebel has changed. The intelligence effort is a continuing one and its vital importance to the success of any mission is well recognized.

In the field of logistics, supply and evacuation is frequently carried out by air. Virtually all French units, when first assigned to an area, will immediately clear a helicopter landing field. Routine supply is made by road but emergency supply and almost all evacuation of wounded is carried out by helicopter and light aircraft.

Air support is available to ground units during daylight hours, over most of Algeria, in a matter of minutes. To achieve this essential support, there is a decentralization of control over certain types of air units. Each division commander, responsible for control of a military Zone (which corresponds to a civil Department) has available to him an Army observation aircraft platoon. In addition, the Division Tactical Air Officer has under his control one squadron of SNJ aircraft based in the Zone. These SNJs are used primarily for armed reconnaissance missions. Their slow speeds make them well suited to close observation of the rugged mountain areas and their armament makes them satisfactory close support type aircraft under the operating conditions existing in that country. Other types of aircraft such as bombardment, long range reconnaissance, transport (to include helicopters) and heavy fighters are retained under the centralized control of three Tactical Air Groups assigned, one each, to support the three Army Corps into which the French Army in Algeria has been grouped.

The use of light observation aircraft and helicopters as flying command posts is gaining in importance. On the larger operations where several battalions may be employed, the operation commander and his air officer are frequently airborne over the objective area. This permits the operation commander to move about rapidly and observe the evolution of the situation and to make adjustments in his plans to meet contingencies as they arise.



*The same story in every army*



*French patrol with native irregular*



*Arab irregular forces are recruited by the French to assist in military operations*





Personal command of this type makes possible the immediate exploitation of intelligence information and greatly increases the chances for success in any operation.

Ground operations are carried out by mobile units. Since information on rebel forces is valid only for a short time, the French must be ready to move the numerous units required for the encirclement (the standard maneuver employed) of an area from dispersed locations with a minimum of delay. Such movements must be made to retain the element of surprise as long as possible. Trucks are most frequently used, however when the time and terrain are such as to make the attainment of certain positions infeasible, helicopters are used to supplement ground transport. These versatile machines are being used in ever increasing numbers. The system for obtaining helicopter support is simple and effective, and helicopters can be made available to ground commanders on short notice.

It should be emphasized that high mobility is a characteristic which the French are trying to provide for all units rather than for just a few. An encirclement requires exceptionally large numbers of troops when related to the size of an enemy force. Actual combat is most often carried out by only a small part of the investing force; however, the other

units are essential to seal off the area of operations. A rifle company may well be all that is required to fight a fifty-man rebel force and destroy it; but it may take two regiments to surround the area where the rebels have been reported. In one such situation six battalions of infantry, one battalion of artillery and one armored car company were utilized to close off a mountainous area in western Algeria where some fifty rebels had been reported. The French force was deployed in the early hours of the day and helicopters and other types of air support were available throughout the deployment and the subsequent sweep of the area. It was ultimately discovered that the rebel force had managed to flee the area with the result that the object of the operation was not realized. The French commander pointed out that such disappointments are frequent even when the intelligence information is reliable, the deployments are discreetly made, communications are good and there is plenty of air support.

From these observations of the Algerian War, it becomes obvious that military forces engaged in limited war operations must rely less on their ability to crush the opponent than on their capability to bend him to their will. The very nature of a limited war indicates that the objec-

tive is to be attained by something less than total force. It is conceivable that atomic weapons may be used in such wars but their employment will be the rare exception rather than the rule. Under many circumstances where the dissident element is diffused throughout a people, such as in Algeria today or in Cyprus a few months ago, atomic weapons are useless.

The French are demonstrating that the limited war cannot be fought, much less won, without ample conventional means. They attempted to decide the Algerian War with few troops. By 1956 it had become obvious that two hundred thousand men could not do the job. Now twice that number are barely capable of maintaining a tenuous status quo.

There is no such thing as a cheap war — even a limited one!

None of the lessons to be observed in the Algerian War are new. The need for flexible plans, mobile forces, and reliable and timely intelligence have all been long recognized as essential factors for successful military operations of all kinds.

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In limited war, however, there is a different emphasis which must be placed on these and other factors. The objective in such wars is not the unconditional surrender of an opponent but rather the gaining of the support of the people. Since this requires less than total violence there must be a compensatory increase in the human or psychological effort to be made. And this effort must be made with troops who are not stimulated by the fervor of a nation engaged in a war for national survival but by troops committed to an unrewarding task in a foreign land while things go on as usual back home. The human effort must be made in two directions. It must be directed outward to the opponent, and it must also be aimed inward towards one's own forces.

The whole problem of waging the limited war can be summarized in the term leadership. This vital quality must exist not only at government and high military levels but must also be diffused throughout the forces in the theater of operations. Perhaps the most significant military event in the Algerian War is the return of personal command in the field. Decentralization of control, the isolation of areas of actual combat operations and the difficulty of obtaining more than fragmentary re-

ports of elusive rebel units have made it essential that commanders follow in person the complete evolution of an operation they command. Plans are still prepared and schemes of maneuver with necessary fire support are worked out, but all these are simple and can easily be changed to meet contingencies. It is no longer possible for a commander to set a plan in motion and then wait at some convenient command post for his subordinates to report their successes. In the fluid war the commander is in the air shifting his point of observation swiftly over a large area, capable of landing at critical points to personally assess the local situation, and always ready to change his plans as the needs arise. Such command is a phenomenon observed only on the rarest occasions in recent wars.

In the final analysis, all leaders must remember that actual combat is not their only responsibility—in fact fighting will often be the easier task.

It may well be that the atomic age has unintentionally brought a new luster to old military virtues which seem to have been largely overwhelmed in recent years by mass destruction from massed forces all responsive to a massive bureaucracy.

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# passing in review

## BOOKS OF INTEREST TO OUR READERS

### Haitian Constabulary . . .

**GARDE D'HAITI**—Compiled by James H. McCrocklin. 262 pages, illustrated, The United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md. \$4.50

*Garde d'Haiti* is a factual account of the formation of the "Haitian Constabulary." The author has relied heavily on official documents, which gives grave authority to the consolidation of history of the *Garde d'Haiti*.

This is a timely book to read, in view of the internal problems that have been plaguing our neighbor Republic of Haiti during the past year. The job performed in Haiti by the Marines during the period 1915-1934 was of national importance. To understand this national importance, one should read this full treatise on the history of the *Garde*. In the period covered by the history of the *Garde*, Haiti was transformed from chaos, resistance and insubordination among Haitian nationals to the pacification, restoration of order and the establishment of a truly democratic government. This pacification has lasted until recent years.

It is more important that this book stands as a document of good neighbor policy and a living refutation against any accusations of American imperialism. Furthermore, it stands as a barrier against the satellite-colonialism of Communist Russia. This book is the sole complete accounting of the Treaty service of the *Garde d'Haiti*.

Under the Haitian-American treaty (1915-1916), the Haitian government obligated itself to create an efficient constabulary composed of native Haitians, to be organized and officered by Americans. The Haitian Army consisted of some 46 regiments and a gendarmerie of 43 companies—included in the Army were some 300 generals and about 50 colonels. After intervention the Haitian Army was completely disbanded.

When the US Marines took over the task of preservation of order, Marine officers became provost marshals in the different towns. The forming of the Treaty *Garde d'Haiti* fell into their hands. Thus Marine officers and non-commissioned officers were instructed to build a national police force from a hodge-podge number of police forces, secret service units, warped, partly corrupted, and extremely ignorant mate-

rial. At the same time, this budding force was expected to maintain order throughout 10,000 square miles of rugged mountain land, and protect the lives of 2,500,000 inhabitants.

The road to success for the *Garde*, and the Marine supervisors was not a happy one. The author has carefully recorded the pattern of events from 1915 to 1934 in an historical vein which is heightened by his collection of photographs and quotes from official documents. Investigations follow in a set political pattern.

The *Garde d'Haiti* left by the Marines in 1934 was a hard core of well trained Haitian officers and enlisted men imbued with a spirit and morale much like their founding Service, the US Marine Corps.

The history of the *Garde*, its function and missions, highlight recent problems arising in Haiti. In 1948 a law made the President Commander-in-Chief of the *Garde*. The same year more aircraft were added to bring the Haitian Air Force to 15; the Navy boasting 19 officers and 155 men within the year was doubled in size. In 1949 the *Garde d'Haiti* was renamed the *Armée d'Haiti*. The change appeared to be academic. Events have proven this to be more than academic. The former national police force is now the *Armée* under command of the President. Of these machinations trouble brews.

Reviewed by BGen R. D. Salmon

Ed: BGen Salmon is Director, Marine Corps Development Center, MCS, Quantico.

### Tactics vs Strategy

**NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY**—Henry A. Kissinger. 400 pages, index, bibliography. Harper & Bros., New York. \$5.00

Although published only a few months ago *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* has gained considerable attention. The thoughts set forth in it have been subjects of editorials and private conversations.

That this book should receive such attention is understandable. It is a study of broad scope, dealing with major problems of national security. Essentially, the book is a strong effort to analyze our national position in relationship to the Soviet Union. In at-

tempting to fulfill this task, Dr. Kissinger presents his analysis of our strategic posture. To state his thesis briefly, this posture is not a happy one.

Dr. Kissinger, who is recognized as an able student of international affairs, has contributed, in the first portion of his book, what is probably one of the most astute analyses of United States-Russian power positions written to date. In reading this portion of the text it is apparent that the author has written with a firm grasp of the subject. His analysis of the United States-Soviet power positions reflect a deep grasp of history, a broad understanding of geopolitics, and an intelligent and practical approach to international relationships.

In the opinion of this reviewer the most impressive portion of this book is that which concerns the problem of all-out nuclear warfare based upon what has been referred to as massive retaliation. The essence of Dr. Kissinger's thesis is that the cataclysmic destruction of all-out nuclear war is so appalling and so sobering that there is, and will continue to be, an understandable reluctance to initiate the massive retaliation which in turn would signal the beginning of a thermonuclear war. Thus, he holds, the degree of provocation required to trigger massive retaliation is so great that Communist aggression is capable of continuing at a level below the provocation point. This results, as the book points up, in a situation wherein Communist encroachment can continue with impunity as long as it is not of such a direct and threatening nature as to invoke massive retaliation.

The irony of the situation, according to the book, is that our final reaction involving massive retaliation is so very powerful that we won't, short of an overt attack upon the most vital aspects of our national security, use this weapon. Consequently the very strength of our ultimate capability is such that it disarms us in the face of a wily, subtle and very dangerous opponent.

Those interested in the question of our national security in these volatile times will find additional interesting reading in Dr. Kissinger's thoughts with respect to limited war. There is nothing equivocal in the author's rejection of all-out war as an instrument of national policy. As he pointedly states, "The American people must be made aware



that with the end of our atomic monopoly all-out war has ceased to be an instrument of policy except as a last resort and that for most of the issues likely to be in dispute, our only choice is between a strategy of limited war or inaction."

Unquestionably there is much in Dr. Kissinger's writing that readily justifies the many compliments he has been accorded since the book's publication. While he writes with assurance and obvious understanding in the broad aspects of international affairs, and particularly the basic strategic problems characterizing the United States' position with respect to the Soviet Union and world communism, it is regretted that the same feeling of the mastery of his subject matter does not characterize his writing in the more specific military matters.

For instance, it is surprising to find the assertion that "the present assignment of roles and missions among the services dates from 1948, when Secretary James Forrestal took the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Key West in order to formulate common doctrine." In making such an assertion Dr. Kissinger makes what is unfortunately an all too common error by contending that service roles and missions originated in the so-called Key West agreement of 1948.

The facts of the matter are that the current roles and missions of the Armed Services stem from the pertinent provisions of the National Security Act as passed and enacted in 1947. In this Act Congress prescribed certain broad roles and missions for each of the four armed services.

It is appropriate to add that this prescription of service roles and missions, as determined by Congress in 1947, stands as an eloquent testament to the traditional wisdom of Congress in resolving such basic problems of national security. In carrying out its constitutional responsibility with respect to the armed services, Congress clearly and simply stated, in the National Security Act of 1947, the basic purposes (roles and missions) for the four services. The really significant thing—and it is indeed a reassuring one—is that were an effort made today to write a set of roles and missions for the armed services, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to set forth in more succinct, sound, yet elastic, and farsighted terms, the roles and missions of our armed services. Congress can indeed derive a deep sense of satisfaction from the fact that the roles and missions set forth by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947 are as applicable to today's strategic situations and technologically advanced weapons as these roles and missions were when originally enacted in 1947.

Actually, what the Key West paper did was to amplify the basic roles and missions as set forth in the law. The Key West paper did not originate anything with respect to roles and missions. It only amplified them.

This apparent confusion on the part of Dr. Kissinger with respect to the Key West document is not exceptional. It points up a need for a clearer understanding of the meaning of roles and missions as compared with functions. A distinct service in the interest of clearer military thought would be realized by usage of the term "roles and missions" only in connection with the service jobs as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, and the term "functions" as pertaining to the amplification of those basic jobs as delineated in the Key West functions paper.

There is another portion of the text that departs from the rich thought and firm mastery that characterizes Dr. Kissinger's handling of the international aspects of the East-West controversy. This discrepancy is again encountered in the author's proposed reorganization of the armed forces. There is something very unrealistic and artificial in his proposal to reorganize the armed forces into two basic organizations, "a Strategic Force and the Tactical Force."

The Tactical Force, according to Dr. Kissinger's proposal would be "units required for a limited war." The Strategic Force would be required for all-out war. There are several strange aspects to such a proposal. To have such forces ear-marked for a specific kind of war effort would result in rigidity rather than a versatility of endeavor. The thing that is needed, above all, to counteract and repel the many-pronged Communist aggression is versatility. Such versatility would not be achieved through self contained Strategic and Tactical Forces. The versatility that is required is demonstrated today by our naval power with its balanced fleets possessing the capability of applying the precise degree of military action all the way from a showing of the flag to the delivery of a thermonuclear explosive.

Such versatility also involves economy of forces and dollar expenditure. In the struggle to maintain a sound economy against the pressures of tremendous defense expenditures and accompanying inflation, financial economy must be a fundamental aspect of our national security. In contrast, the lack of versatility that would characterize division of the armed forces into Tactical and Strategic Forces, would result inevitably in a higher cost price on the armed forces, and this higher cost would not be reflected in greater national security.

Such a revolutionary realignment of our defense structure would require, in

practice, the abandonment of our war-proven Joint Chiefs of Staff system, and the substitution of some form of single chief of staff—supreme general staff. This is because in its final application the kind of Strategic and Tactical Forces, as proposed by Dr. Kissinger, would require some form of supreme command set-up.

Thus, paradoxically, the author's proposal, designed to bring about what he feels would be a more modern defense organization, would result actually in the retrogression to the inflexible ivory tower type of command that was militarily obsolete at the end of the last century.

Of course there is also sound military reason to question his attempt to divide the armed forces into what might be described as Tactical and Strategic Forces. The artificiality of such an arrangement is readily manifest to military readers. This is because there is no firm delineation between tactics and strategy in the actual applications of military power. In application, the semantic difference between tactics and strategy becomes blurred and indistinct. What may be a strategic move on the part of a higher commander is tactics to the company commander or squad leader who ultimately carries out the task.

Also, in the broad conduct of war a limited or tactical offense may well be a part of an over-all strategic defensive scheme. Conversely, a tactical holding or defensive operation could be a major aspect of a broader offensive strategy. Thus, in these, as in an endless number of similar examples, the terms "tactics" and "strategy" lose their meaning in the designation of forces. In short, there is a fundamental fallacy in his proposal for the reorganization and composition of our armed forces. The defense of the free world against the many-headed Communist aggression can not be based upon a military counterpart of the highly specialized platoon-system of football. Neither our military endeavor nor our nation's taxpayers can be subjected to such an inefficient device.

Because of the notice that has been accorded this book to date and the attention which it will continue to receive for some time in the future, and because Dr. Kissinger's great contributions which he makes through his dissertation on the danger of relying entirely on thermonuclear capability, this book is valuable reading for not only the military reader but also for all those interested in our problems of international policy and national security.

Reviewed by Col J. D. Hittle

Ed: Col Hittle is Legislative Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and is a well known military writer.

## Books About the Sea . . .

**PICTURE HISTORY OF THE U.S. NAVY**—Theodore Roscoe & Fred Freeman. 1012 illustrations with captions. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. \$12.50

**CHERISH THE SEA**—Jean de la Varende. 348 pages, illustrated. Translated from the French by Mervyn Sarill. The Viking Press, New York. \$5.00

**THE AGE OF PIRACY**—Robert Carse. 276 pages, illustrated. Rinehart & Company, Inc., New York. \$4.50

The sea has come in recently for considerable treatment in the literary world. The above books, while diversified in content, have to do with ships and various men who sailed them.

*Picture History of the US Navy* attempts to fill a void which has required attention for a long time. In many ways it is remarkable work, for it contains a vast array of illustrative material that would be extremely difficult to duplicate. Both contemporary material pertaining to every era of our Navy's history and the work of modern artists is included. Co-author Freeman has contributed some dramatic sketches of sea life giving ample evidence to his great abilities as an artist.

It is unfortunate that such a much-needed work would in the end contain so many unnecessary faults. The captions are not only inaccurate in many instances; they are sometimes placed opposite the wrong illustrations. Another failing, in the eyes of this reviewer, is the confusion of material that is jumbled onto the pages. The captions are extremely short and far too crispy in style to effectively tell a story. So much is going on that the reader is inclined to become dizzy from the effect, thus losing the impact of what is available.

*Cherish the Sea* is a translation of the original French work *La Navigation Sentimentale* which was first published in 1952. It effectively traces the development of the science of ship-building under sail and chronicles man's attempt to conquer both the sea and his enemies upon the sea. Commencing with ancient Egypt, the contribution of each of the maritime nations is documented in a pleasant style somewhat reminiscent of the late Hendrik van Loon.

Included are studies of 5 great naval battles (Salamis, Actium, Lepanto, the Armada and Trafalgar) besides such relatively forgotten history as the naval aspects of the crusades. The author's own rich heritage in the French Navy may cause the Anglo-Saxon to question the space given to the Gallic effort, but

this is only because most British-American marine literature deals primarily with the part our own forebears played in the story of the sea. It is refreshing to be reminded that even at the time of Nelson, the French were constructing probably the finest warships then afloat—a point that Nelson would have been the first to support.



*The Age of Piracy*, written by a professional sailor well acquainted with the Caribbean, claims to be a "definitive one-volume work on the exciting Golden Age of piracy." While it smacks

at times of the thrilling spirit of the sea wolves, it attempts to cover much in a limited space. Starting with the organization of the Brethren of the Coast on the island of Tortuga, the author traces the derivation of the terms freebooter (from the "frei-bote", swift, lateen rigged craft made by Hollanders who joined the Brethren) and buccaneer (the name applied to the Brethren who hunted for the community and cured their meats over open fire pits called *boncans*). Described are the way they lived, fought and divided their spoil. Debunked are such myths as "walking the plank" (there is only one recorded instance).

Carse paints the buccaneers against a background of treachery and incredible hazards. Not only had they to contend with the pest holes, the jungles and the constant challenge of sudden death in pitched battles, but looming in the background for much of the time were the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition. Much material has been assembled, some appearing for the first time in English, which should make for good reading and an interesting addition to a nautical library.

Reviewed by LtCol J. H. Magruder III

ED: LtCol Magruder is curator of the Marine Corps Museum at MGS, Quantico.

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


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
# THE TRANSGRESSOR CONCEPT

By Cdr H. B. Seim, USN



UNATIONS





**An intriguing proposal to lessen some**

**of the problems of employing a UN**

**peace-keeping force in the field**

THE UNITED NATIONS DECISION IN November 1956 to deploy a multinational army to the Middle East (the United Nations Emergency Force) refocused the attention of the world on some of the problems related to so-called "police" action by the UN. This is not the first time that the UN has resorted to the use of collective armed force to restore international peace. In 1950, the UN responded to North Korean aggression against the Republic of South Korea by organizing the United Nations Command and deploying its forces to support South Korean resistance. There are, however, significant differences between the situation that existed in Korea in 1950 and that which prevailed in the Middle East in the fall of 1956. Present conditions in the Middle East suggest that the UN armed forces could be called upon to function as an independent peace-keeping agency rather than in direct support of a victim of aggression. If the UN force is deployed in such a peace-keeping role, under what conditions will the commander initiate military action? What criteria will he use to decide whether to take such action? And against whom? Can the commander of such a UN force be given the power of decision?


The basis for possible UN action in a troubled situation such as exists in the Middle East is found in Article 39 of the UN charter. This article states that "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 41 provides that the Security Council may decide what measures not involving use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and that it may call upon members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. If the Security Council should consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate, or if these measures when

applied actually prove to be inadequate, under Article 42 it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the UN.

In the background of the present Arab/Israeli tension lies a 6-year period of negligible progress by the UN and the Western powers in settling the dispute. All of the original causes of the dissension remain, and to these have been added certain other factors which have had an adverse catalytic effect: for example, the extension of Soviet Bloc influence into the Middle East area and the militant Arab leadership in the person of Colonel Nasser of Egypt. Overshadowing these developments have been such events as the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Israeli attack into Sinai and the subsequent partial occupation of the Suez Canal zone by a combined Franco-British force.

Except for the initial effort on the part of the UN to bring about armistice agreements between the parties to the Arab/Israeli conflict in 1949, the major UN participation has been through the activities of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), under Major General Burns of the Canadian Army. Contrary to the popular belief, UNTSO is not a police force. It has no enforcement authority, nor does it possess the actual military power which would be required to maintain peace by threat of force. This is no reflection on UNTSO; it was conceived originally as an observing and reporting agency only. The movements of its personnel are at the pleasure of the nations who are parties to the armistice agreements. The UNTSO observers collect the facts and submit reports to the UN. The resultant action on the part of the UN has been confined generally to the passage of resolutions calling on the parties concerned to observe the armistice agreements and, on occasion, censuring them for willful violation of these agreements.

In view of the failure of past UN efforts to resolve the Arab/Israeli dispute, and in the light of recent developments in the Middle East, it



*Camel train and armored cars meet in Iran*

is quite possible that the UN could decide to deploy UN armed forces to that area "to maintain or restore international peace or security."

The mission of maintaining or restoring international peace is a very broad one. As intimated earlier, it could involve punitive military action to punish an aggressor and to succor a victim. On the other hand, it could be directed more toward an independent peace-keeping function. In any event, the commander of UN forces which might be sent to the Middle East would require a more precise delineation of his tasks. What would the UN tell its commander insofar as the purpose of UN military activity was concerned? What would be his specific tasks?

Some indication of the probable purpose of UN military intervention can be found in the earlier UN actions with respect to the Arab/Israeli dispute. On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution providing for the partition of the former British mandate of Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states. In adopting this resolution, the General Assembly requested, among other things, that the Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the resolution. When the Palestine Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors were signed in 1949, the UN once again indicated that it would not condone any attempt by either side to change the armistice lines or adjust the boundaries by force. Later UN resolutions relating to border incidents have in fact censured one side or the other for the use of force.

From this we can infer that the specific tasks of a UN police force would be to deter any attempt to alter the armistice lines by force and to take punitive military action against those parties which did make such an attempt. Presumably such punitive military action would supplement non-military measures taken under the provisions of Article 41 of the UN Charter, and would quite probably be confined, at least initially, to efforts to bring about a restoration of the violated armistice lines.

Now that we have defined to some extent the specific tasks which an independent UN peace-keeping force might be called upon to perform, we can explore more thoroughly the conditions under which the commander might initiate military action. There appear to be two alternative criteria which might be used to determine when and against



*Korean infantrymen*



whom military countermeasures should be taken.

The first criterion is implied in the 29 November 1947 Palestine partition resolution mentioned above. It will be recalled that the General Assembly requested the Security Council to determine as a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression (italics supplied) any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the resolution. Thus military action might be conditioned on a determination by the Security Council that one or more of the parties is an "aggressor." For purposes of easy reference, we will call this "The Aggressor Concept."

The second criterion can be derived from a specific task which we have deduced for the UN police force, namely, to take punitive military action to restore the violated armistice lines. In this situation, military action would be dependent on a determination that the armistice lines had been violated. We can designate this as "The Transgressor Concept."

The Aggressor Concept is essentially the pattern followed by the UN in Korea. However, the application of this concept in the Middle East situation will be difficult, if not impossible. The pattern of military operations in the Arab/Israeli dispute has developed in such a fashion that justification can be found to brand either side as an ag-

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gressor on the basis of past incidents. It can be expected that an outbreak of major hostilities in the future would be preceded by a gradual intensification of military activity on both sides. In this event, each could claim provocation. Each party could claim self defense with some justification. In all probability the situation would be so confused that a clear-cut decision as to which party was the aggressor would be impossible. If UN military countermeasures were to be conditioned on a prior determination that one or more of the parties to the dispute were an aggressor, failure to reach such a determination would effectively preclude any UN military intervention.

In this connection, it must be appreciated that the branding of a state as an aggressor carries with it the implication that the state so named is responsible for initiating the conflict. It is a definite form of censure or condemnation. Thus, emotional and moral overtones are injected into the process of deter-

mining whether a state is an aggressor. It is highly unlikely that a UN commander in the field would be given the authority and responsibility of making such a determination. This function properly resides in the Security Council or General Assembly. However, the decision-reaching machinery in the UN can be time-consuming. Furthermore, there is always the likelihood of a veto in the Security Council. These features preclude the use of the Aggressor Concept as an effective criterion for the initiation of UN military counteraction.

The Aggressor Concept has another undesirable connotation, particularly insofar as the scope, intensity and duration of military operations is concerned. If the UN should decide to commit the UN police force to assist the victim of an attack by an aggressor, it tacitly identifies itself with the war objectives of the victim. Presumably these objectives will entail as a minimum the repelling of the attack and the restoration of the boun-



**Ethiopian army**



**Chinese Nationalists**



**US Marines**



daries or armistice lines. It is also quite probable, however, that the objectives of the victim would include additional punitive measures to punish the aggressor, which could range from retaliatory attacks to complete annihilation of the aggressor.

Thus, the Aggressor Concept may indirectly lead to UN military involvement far beyond that which police action would imply.

The second criterion, the Transgressor Concept, involves a determination of the state or states whose armed forces cross established boundaries or armistice lines. Such transgression could be consummated by ground, sea, or air elements, or combinations thereof. The identification of a specific state as a transgressor can be based on relatively easily recognizable actions. If the armed forces of a state cross established boundaries or armistice lines, that state becomes a transgressor. This determination can be made without reference to prior incidents, either military or non-military, which might have to be considered in reaching a decision on the question

of aggression. The Transgressor Concept eliminates emotional, moral and psychological factors. For these reasons, the UN could very well delegate to the UN commander in the field the authority to make a determination as to whether a state is a transgressor.

From the viewpoint of practical functioning of the decision-making process, the Transgressor Concept is easier and faster, as well as more defensible, than the Aggressor Concept. The Transgressor Concept also offers other significant advantages.

Since the UN commander in the field would be able to make an immediate decision as to the transgression, he could initiate prompt countermeasures. The value of rapid and effective action cannot be over-emphasized. Certainly this task would be much greater if he is forced to stand idly by for a considerable period of time before taking any counteraction, while in the meantime the invading forces establish themselves in the seized territory. Furthermore, enforced inaction on the part of the UN commander can render his own position

untenable, particularly if his forces are disposed along the armistice lines or boundaries when the fighting breaks out.

The Transgressor Concept also promises to be a more effective deterrent to an attempt to alter boundaries or armistice lines by force, especially in situations similar to those which prevail in the Middle East. The prospect of UN military countermeasures is much more probable. If the Aggressor Concept were to be used as the criterion, and the parties to the dispute were aware of this, they might be tempted to ignore the threat of the UN police force in anticipation that its use would be forestalled through an inability of the UN to identify the aggressor.

One possible disadvantage of the Transgressor Concept is that the UN force may find itself engaged against both sides at the same time. In other words, transgression can occur in both directions simultaneously. This is particularly true in the case of air or naval action, but it can also happen on the ground. However, this also highlights a weakness in the Aggressor Concept, which does not cover the possibility that the "victim" may not repel the "aggressor" but may in turn invade his territory. What does the UN police force do then—switch sides?

It is apparent that the deployment of an independent UN peace-keeping force poses a number of problems which the use of UN forces in Korea did not raise. This discussion has by no means exhausted all of them, or even mentioned all of them. Nevertheless, serious consideration will have to be given in the UN to the delineation of the tasks of such a force and to the conditions under which it would initiate military countermeasures. The specific tasks for a UN police force should be to discourage an attempt by a party to the dispute to change established boundaries or armistice lines through the use of armed force and, if such an attempt is made, to bring about an end to the fighting and a restoration of the violated boundaries or lines. Under these circumstances, the Transgressor Concept should be used as the criterion to determine when and where military counteraction should be undertaken.

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Gentlemen . . . Dinner Is Served	Fraser, Mar
Col John W. Thomason, Jr., Chronicler	
of The Corps	Willock, May
Founders and Original Members of the	
Marine Corps Association	June
The Brain Pickers of Barrett Hall	Nicholson, July
Wildlife Conservation	Stolley, Dec

### Personnel and Administration

Rotate by Battalions	Sheridan, April
Transfer the Unit	Brown, July
Enlisted Detail	Drake, Aug
Is Paper Work Necessary?	Pickle, Nov

### Physical Fitness

Fit to Fight	Meeker, Nov
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### Supply and Logistics

Much Ado About Money	Millichap, Jan
Mess Officer—An Additional Duty	McCarthy, Feb
FMF Organization and Composition Board	
Report—Service Elements	July
Planning Future Medical Support	Johnson, July
Secret Weapons for Supply	Roose, Sept.
Engineer Support to the FMF	Cooper, Dec

### Tactics and Techniques

Displace the Combat Base	Fredericks, Jan
ATA Plt—An Orphan?	Kloefkorn, Feb
Tactics of the Atomic Age—	
A Study in Principles	Cushman, Feb
Military Operations Research	Mitchell, Feb
No Compromise Here	O'Keefe, Mar
Penny-Wise Pound-Foolish	Sloan, Mar
Trouble in Hell Fire Valley	Montross, Mar
FMF Organization and Composition Board	
Report—The Division	April
The Defense of the West	Johnson, April
Infantry Dig!	Kennon, April
Case for the 2-Man Recon Teams	Knowlton, April
A Bigger Bite for Interdiction	Johnson, May

TITLE	AUTHOR AND MONTH
Vertical Envelopment — Successful If .....	Haslam, May
The Key—Mobility .....	Frank, May
FMF Organization and Composition Board Report—Fire Support .....	June
Fight the Enemy .....	Prickett, Oct

## Training

Marines Learn the "Joint" .....	Cushman, Jan
Base Plate McGurk .....	Jan
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TITLE	AUTHOR AND MONTH
Red and Gold Schoolhouse .....	Puckett, May
Yours for the Asking .....	Hess, Aug
Improve the NCO School .....	Crumb, Oct
The Marine Corps Reserve .....	Stickney, Oct, Nov, Dec

## ABC Warfare

The Infantry in Atomic Warfare .....	Harper, May
Individual Atomic Defense .....	Kritter, May
Must Our Cities Be Battlefields? .....	Parsons, May
First Aid—Atomic Style .....	Hanker, Aug

# PASSING IN REVIEW, BOOK REVIEWS

TITLE	AUTHOR AND MONTH
The Marine Officer's Guide .....	Thomas, Heinl, Ageton, Jan
Pork Chop Hill .....	Marshall, Jan
Communism and Nationalism in The Middle East .....	Laqueur, Jan
Alps and Elephants .....	deBeer, Jan
The Invisible Flag .....	Bamn, Jan
A Military History of the Western World Vol III .....	Fuller, Feb
Arms and Men .....	Millis, Feb
The War Potential of Nations .....	Knorr, Feb
Complete Guide for the Serviceman's Wife ..	Land, Glines, Feb
Our Family Affairs .....	Glines, Feb
Atoms and Energy .....	Massey, Feb
Ship 16—the Story of the German Raider <i>Atlantis</i> ..	Mohr, Feb
They Met at Gettysburg .....	Stackpole, Feb
A Short History of Russia .....	Charques, Feb
Modern Marine Engineering .....	Rudorff, Feb
The Last Parallel .....	Russ, Mar
Satellite! .....	Bergaust, Beller, Mar
This Hallowed Ground .....	Catton, Mar
A Different Valor: The Story of General Joseph E. Johnston .....	Goven, Livingood, Mar
Arms and Armor in Colonial America .....	Peterson, Mar
Year's Pictorial History of the World ..	The Editors of Year, Mar
Samurai .....	Saito, Caidin, April
The Battles that Changed History .....	Pratt, April
Combat in Russia, 1941-1944 .....	Kissel, April
The Machine Gun, Vol IV .....	Chinn, April
Sound of the Guns .....	Downey, April
The New Psychology for Leadership .....	Laird, Laird, April
The FBI Story .....	Whitehead, April
100 Hours to Suez .....	Henriques, May
Defeat into Victory .....	Slim, May
At Whatever Cost .....	Thompson, May
A Ride to Panmunjom .....	Thorin, May

TITLE	AUTHOR AND MONTH
Give Us This Day .....	Stewart, June
The Fate of East Central Europe .....	Ed by Kertesz, June
Reminiscences of Big I .....	Wood, June
'45-70' Rifles .....	Behn, June
The Central Blue .....	Slessor, July
Day of Infamy .....	Lord, July
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The Turn of the Tide .....	Bryant, Aug
Alexander The Great and His Time .....	Savill, Aug
Battle for the Mind .....	Sargent, Sept
The Admiral Horthy Memoirs .....	Sept
They Fought for the Sky .....	Reynolds, Sept
The New World .....	Churchill, Oct
The Labyrinth .....	Schellenberg, Oct
Battle for Manhattan .....	Bliven, Oct
Small Arms and Ammunition .....	Lewis, Oct
General George B. McClellan: Shield of the Union .....	Hassler, Oct
The Bernal Diaz Chronicles .....	Trans & Ed by Idell, Oct
The Battle of Cassino .....	Majdalany, Nov
The Arab-Israeli War 1948 .....	O'Ballance, Nov
The Secret War .....	Pawle, Nov
There Goes the Middle East .....	Lilienthal, Nov
Garde d'Haiti .....	Compiled by McCrocklin, Dec
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy .....	Kissinger, Dec
Picture History of the US Navy .....	Roscoe & Freeman, Dec
Cherish the Sea .....	Varende, Dec
The Age of Piracy .....	Carse, Dec

# OBSERVATION POST

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Jr Officer—Sr NCO Relationship .....	Crumb, July

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A Diet For The Command Post .....	McCarthy, Oct
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About Choppers—Be Mobile .....	Crawford, Dec
Readiness Through Competition and Recognition .....	Robertson, Dec

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